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It is commonplace in wage determination models and, in general, in economic models 
as a whole, to treat the workers’ outside option as given. The main purpose of the 
present work is to remove, in various ways, this assumption. The work is organized 
as follows. The first chapter is devoted to introducing the thesis topic and the related 
literature. The second chapter describes an economy in which the workers hired by a 
firm acquire without cost a firm-specific skill that enables them to potentially become 
independent producers. Thus, by modelling explicitly the workers’ decision to stay or 
to leave the firm, a stable earning profile for the economy is characterized. Such a 
stable earning profile can allow for a workers’ compensation higher than the basic neo­
classical wage and for pay differentials across industries even for initially homogenous 
workers. The third chapter shows that the existence of a concrete outside option for 
firms’ managers can induce, under specific circumstances, oligopolistic firms to adopt 
restrictive output practises. In particular, the conditions under which, in a Cournot 
oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot model, are 
carefully defined. The fourth chapter considers the problem of producer co-operatives’ 
(PCs) stability. It shows that PCs’ instability argued in the literature can fail to hold 
in very competitive and low barrier-to-entry markets in which, potentially, dismissed 
members have a chance to set up new firms. In the fifth and conclusive chapter a new 
concept of core-stability for ^.-cooperative games is introduced and applied both to the 
problem of cartel formation under oligopoly and to an economy with a public good. 
Such a solution concept, denoted ^core, assumes that when a coalition deviates from 
an agreement, it possesses a first-mover advantage with respect to all other players.
Keywords: Coalitions, Cooperative Games, Collusion, Core, Managers Compen­
sation, Oligopoly, Public Goods, Self-employment, Wage Determination.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is commonplace in wage determination models and, in general, in economic models 
as a whole, to treat the workers’ outside option as given. This is the case both in 
standard bargaining models and in mainstream labour market models in which, usually, 
the option of every worker is somewhat dichotomous: she or he can either accept a 
certain pay by a firm or organization whatsoever, or stay inactive, thus obtaining an 
amount of money that, without loss of generality, can be normalized to zero.
While under certain modelling circumstances this appears as an innocuous and 
even useful simplifying assumption, in other contexts the same assumption seems, at 
the best, questionable. In particular, such an implicit presumption of passive behaviour 
on the part of every worker, either when negotiations with the firm break down or when 
there is simply an insufficient labour demand, cannot be accepted as a primitive of a 
model as such. In a model without credit constraints and without transaction costs of 
any sort, why should workers remain idle when facing involuntary unemployment or 
also when they are voluntarily leaving their workplace?
In a world where either the barriers to entry are not a serious obstacle or in which 
there is a way in which inactive workforce can become active - through the constitu­
tion of self-employed units, partnerships or entrepreneurial firms alike - every worker’s 
outside option cannot be treated as exogenous. It should, indeed, be considered as part 
of the model variables, i.e., in economic words, be viewed as endogenous to the model 
itself.
The major purpose of the present work (at least, in three of its chapters) is to remove 
in various ways the above assumption, under the opposite presumption of an active 
(rather than passive) behaviour on the part of every worker, and, hence, look at the 
consequence of this point of view. The starting point is that, although the workers that 
have never been recruited by a firm may not possess any ability to organize their own 
work, and then their outside option is something given (that can also be normalized to 
zero), all workers that have been engaged in a firm, own the necessary skill to organize 
the production process. This dichotomy between skilled and unskilled workers is the 
key to make endogenous the outside option of all skilled workers and hence, derive 
interesting results.
In most parts of the work, the main modelling tool will be game theory and, in 
particular, 72-person cooperative games. Such a tool, apart from being extremely useful 
in economic applications, possesses an interest in itself. The last chapter of the thesis 
will explore a new concept of equilibrium for 72-player cooperative games, denoted (j)- 
core, that allows every deviating coalition to have a first-mover advantage with respect 
to the outside players. To present its characteristics, this concept will also be applied 
to two well known traditional problems of cooperative games: cartel formation under 
oligopoly and public good provision in a 72-player economy.
1.1 W ages determ ination  and labour m arkets
The second chapter of this thesis presents a model that attempts to analyse the wage 
determination problem through a completely different approach from that usually 
adopted by the traditional neoclassical models. It is well known that in the neoclassical 
models wages are determined competitively by the forces of supply and demand and 
respond to shortages or surpluses of labour in their various markets. In these models 
such forces interact to determine a structure of wages and earnings that reflect the 
willingness of labour to supply itself to the various jobs on offer, and the willingness of 
employers to pay workers for their marginal products.^ However, this standard view of
^This approach is also in accordance with the seminal Adam Smith’s (1776) theory of ’’compen­
sating wage differentials”.
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the labour markets has been questioned in many different ways. First, the empirical 
evidence shows that similar jobs in different firms are often associated with significantly 
different wage rates.^ Second, persistent interindustry wage differences for similar jobs 
are observed in many industrialized countries.^ Third, the persistence of both wages 
stickiness and unemployment is inconsistent with the neoclassical competition models.^
Although many recent contributions have attempted to tackle these problems, cur­
rently a conclusive and convincing explanation does not exist for any of them. To 
provide just a simple example, efficiency wage theory^ explanations of interindustry 
wage differentials, based on the different efficiency wage premiums existing in different 
industries, has been criticized on empirical and theoretical grounds.®
At a completely different level, interindustry wage differentials can be explained, for 
instance, by the traditional bargaining models, through the observation that workers’ 
bargaining power can vary across different industries even for similar jobs.^ Nash’s 
(1950) axiomatic bargaining solution probably represents one of the most popular and 
broadly used frameworks not only in the labour economic literature but in economic 
analysis as a whole.® The extensive use of two-player bargaining models has been also
^The labour market segmentation position can be traced back at least to John Stuart Mill (1871) 
and Cairnes (1874) who rejected Adam Smith’s competitive theory, almost a century later to the 
American institutionalists (Dunlop (1957), Kerr (1954)), and, more recently to the theories of internal 
labour market (Doeringer and Piore (1971)) and, among others, to the efficiency wage explanations 
of wage differentials (see, among the others, Weiss (1980), Krueger and Summer (1988)).
^See, for instance Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summer (1988), for tentative expla­
nations of such a phenomenon.
^Here we do not even attempt to give a detailed list of contributors to this relevant point. An 
updated survey is contained, for instance, in Bosworth, Dawkins and Stromback (1996).
^See, among others, Solow (1989), Salop (1979) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); for accurate 
surveys, see Weiss (1990) and Akerlof and Yellen (1986).
®See, for instance, the criticisms raised by Murphy and Tophel (1990) on Kruger and Summer’s 
(1988) empirical work.
 ^ A simple and updated survey of the effect of workers’ bargaining power on wage determination 
both in unionized and non unionized companies, is contained, for instance, in Booth (1995).
^For an extensive presentation of cooperative and non-cooperative two-player bargaining games, 
see Osborne and Rubinstein (1989).
due to the noncooperative foundations recently given to this approach.^ However, the 
description of the intra-firm bargaining process through a two-player model (a group 
of workers on the one hand and a firm or a system of firms on the other), restricts 
the analysis by imposing in some cases an excessively simple set of institutional and 
behavioural assumptions. This is especially true when considering the changes which 
have recently occurred to the structure of negotiations in labour markets. In recent 
years Western economies have witnessed an increasing degree of decentralization of 
wage negotiation coupled with an upward trend in self-em ploym ent.A ssociated with 
the adoption of a wide variety of fiexible compensation schemes, such phenomena have 
somewhat complicated the analysis of industrial relations and labour markets. As 
underlined at the beginning, another limitation of traditional bargaining models is that 
reservation wages are usually assumed exogenous. Conversely, it may well be possible 
that reservation wages vary either across firms (due to different firm-specific skills of 
workers) or across industries (for the different opportunities existing for the workers 
hired in different sectors).
The model of the next chapter, although adopting a rather strong assumption, 
yields results very different from a standard neoclassical model. The model describes 
an economy in which, initially, there are two different types of individuals; the entre­
preneurs, endowed with the knowledge of a given production process and the workers, 
endowed with just one unit of labour but without any knowledge on how to produce 
a commodity. Initially the workers are assumed to be indifferent with respect to the 
range of jobs offered by different industries. Moreover, once hired by a firm, they are 
all capable of performing any job, with the training taking the form of a virtually in­
stantaneous on-the-job-training without cost for the firm.^^ The main feature of the
®The basic reference of the non-cooperative approach is Rubinstein (1982). For extensive compar­
isons of Nash and other game-theoretic approaches to the bargaining problem, see Sutton (1986) and 
Binmore et al. (1986).
^°See, for instance, Freeman (1995) for a reviews of the decentralization of wage negotiation in the 
U.S. and U.K., and Blau (1987) and Aronson (1991) for a description of self-employment trends.
^^When self-employment is interpreted as a pay system typified by highly output-related pay and 
independence of workers’ action (Garen (1996)), it seems to exist a link between the two phenomena 
indicated above.
^^This makes the model different from all those models in which workers’ training is costly for the 
firm (see, among others, Lindbeck and Snower’s (1988) insider-outsider model).
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model is that, once recruited by a firm, workers acquire sufiBcient skill to potentially 
set up new competitive units. Thus, even if workers are completely substitutable and 
interchangeable, their potential competing threat may constitute a good reason for 
existing companies to keep them within the firm through the payment of a wage higher 
than the usual neoclassical wage. As a result, one of the model features is that work­
ers’ reservation wage are not given but rather depend on the specific industry in which 
the workers are employed. Given such assumptions, the model adopts a cooperative 
game-theoretic solution concept to determine a stable earning profile for the economy. 
Such an earning profile possesses interesting characteristics. First, workers’ equilib­
rium wage are usually higher than the basic neoclassical (reservation) wage; second, 
wage differentials across industries for initially homogeneous workers naturally arise in 
equilibrium; thirdly, the existence of involuntary unemployment can be sustained as a 
stable equilibrium of the economy.
The impossibility for entrepreneurs to write binding agreements with workers, giv­
ing rise to a form of at-will employment contract for the firms, is a feature that the 
present model shares with the intra-firm multilateral bargaining framework recently 
introduced by Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1997). In their model, the firm bargains with 
each single worker before production starts, under the presumption that a worker can 
leave at will at any time prior to production. However, there are many differences be­
tween the two models. First, in Stole and Zwiebel’s model every worker is completely 
irreplaceable, while we assume, conversely, that workers are completely replaceable. 
Second, differently from the Cournot type of competition assumed in our model, in 
their model competition is implicitly introduced (Stole and Zwiebel (1996), p.221). 
Third, differently from the variable reservation wage raised here, in their model work­
ers’ reservation wages are basically given. Finally, in their model, the employees can 
leave the firm only individually and not as a group, as happens here. As far as their 
results are concerned, the authors show that the multilateral bargaining model gives 
rise to overemployment rather than, as in ours, to unemployment.
For the explicit consideration of the possibility of workers forming coalitions and for 
the use of a M-player cooperative game setting, our model possesses some similarities 
with the more general approach presented in Ichiishi (1981).^^ Indeed, in Ichiishi’s
13 See also Ichiishi (1997), for a more extended description of his social coalition equilibrium.
work the set of players is not initially partitioned into two different groups and, differ­
ently from the multi-sector oligopolistic economy presented here, a general equilibrium 
framework is adopted; finally, the type of equilibrium the author uses, the social coali- 
tional equilibrium, does not require, as the one presented here, any type of consistency 
of each coalitional deviation.
1.2 M anagers’ com pensation  and firm s’ collusive  
behaviour
The idea that the participation in a firm’s activity potentially enables employees to 
organize competing firms by themselves, can very suitably describe the large number 
of responsibilities that companies often delegate either to their highly skilled workforce 
or to their company executive officers (CEOs). If such a delegation implies a learning 
process for the highly qualified employees, it may well be the case that such a knowledge 
acquisition gives rise to the employees’ threat to leave the firm and either set up a 
competitive venture or just work for another firm, thus revealing relevant information.
Although there exists a well known economic literature^^ claiming that, under 
oligopoly, the delegation of sales decisions to managers can both be profitable for the 
firms’ owners as well as boost every firm’s output with respect to a standard Cournot 
model, the rise in managers’ compensation due to managers’ threat of leaving can also 
be thought to yield opposite results. Whilst in principle the incentive package for 
managers is the responsibility of the owners, most frequently pay is set by executive 
compensation committees consisting of non-executive directors or by senior executives 
themselves. Since managers’ compensation is a cost component for the company.
^^For a more explicit treatment of the cooperative game literature, see section 1.4 and section 5.1. 
^®See, amongst others, Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987).
^^See, for instance, for detailed and explanatory empirical works, Jensen and Murphy (1990) for 
the U.S., and Main (1992) for the U.K..
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it may well be argued that the "fat cats” phenomenon within the companies reduces 
competition and output in a given market, when compared to a standard oligopoly 
model.
The model presented in the third chapter explores this possibility. The model de­
scribes a noncooperative game among every company’s owner and each hired manager. 
The latter has to decide whether to accept the offered compensation or leave and 
setup a new business. As a result, the model shows that, under rather general circum­
stances, there may be an output restriction with respect to a standard Cournot model. 
Moreover, equilibrium executives’ compensation turns out to be negatively related to 
the initial number of firms existing in the market and sensitive (although not in a 
unidirectional way) to existing setup costs. Although the relationship between senior 
executives’ pay and company performance has become a source of controversy in re­
cent y e a r s , th e  direct link found in our model between company’s sales and managers’ 
compensation is, usually, empirically confirmed.
As a final remark, it has to be stressed that the model presented here is not meant 
to describe a world in which firms’ managers attempt, whenever possible, to leave their 
companies to set up new businesses; it rather aims at representing a world in which 
such a potential threat exists, thus yielding relevant distortions to input allocation and 
market output.
^^See, among others, Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993) for a description of this debate.
^®See, for an empirical work on non-owners managers’ compensation and firms’ size in the U.K., 
Watson et al. (1994). Remarkably, also the work by Smith and Szymanski (1995) reverses Jensen and 
Murphy’s result by including a participation constraint in the extimations of companies’ performances. 
In particular, their paper shows that since a ” going rate” must be paid to executives to deter them 
to leave the current firm and sign an incentive contract with another firm, CEOs’ outside option will 
also depend on other firms’ performance and hence, the elasticity of top executives to performances 
will be larger than it would be without this effect.
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1.3 T h e v iab ility  o f  labour-m anaged organizations
Although by 1981 EC countries had over 14,000 Producer Co-operatives (PCs) with 
employment in these firms totalling about half a million people, the incidence of PCs 
remains small relative to conventional organizational forms in Western economies. 
Theoretical and empirical literature has attempted in various ways to explain both the 
birth and the viability of PCs in industrialized e c o n o m ie s .I t  is well known that the 
benchmark model of all theoretical contributions on PCs behaviour is represented by 
W ard’s (1958) seminal model of the ” Illyrian” firm, in which the usual profit maximand 
of the neoclassical firm is replaced by per member value added. The idea of a ” life­
cycle” for PCs, which can be traced back to Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1890), Tugan- 
Baranovskii (1921), and more recently to Miyazaki (1984) and Ben-ner (1984), can, 
in a sense, be derived from Ward’s model. The argument is that, whenever PCs are 
successful, they have a tendency to transform into more conventional profit-maximizing 
firms. This mainly depends on the rent-seeking behaviour of members who receive 
a share of value added in excess of the going market wage paid to similar workers. 
Replacing a member by a hired worker increases the share of value added paid to all 
remaining workers. As a result, since all members are potentially replaceable by hired 
workers, over time a PC just becomes a single member profit-maximizing firm.
The aim of the fourth chapter of this work is, once again, to introduce a different 
presumption on the behaviour of every excluded member. In fact, by explicitly intro­
ducing the possibility for every member, when dismissed, to be self-employed or to 
set up another firm, different results arise with respect to the PCs life-cycle described 
above. Since every member’s outside option is no longer given, a PC can, under cer­
tain circumstances, be stable. Two cases are considered: in the first, although the 
going wage rate is given, a dismissed member can create a new venture; in the sec­
ond, conversely, the wage rate is treated endogenously through the consideration of
^^See, for instance, Ben-ner (1988) and Bonin, Jones and Putter man (1993), for empirical surveys on 
Producer Co-operatives (PCs). These are currently the most spread type of democratic organizations 
amongst all existing labour-managed forms of organization. We will mostly refer, throughout this 
section and chapter 4, to PCs.
Surveys are contained, for instance, in Vanek (1970), Ireland and Law (1982), Bonin and Putter- 
man (1983) and Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993).
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stability requirements. Accordingly, two different sets of results follow. The first is 
that the elasticity of market demand is an important variable in explaining whether 
or not the process of members’ dismissal from a PC is profitable for all remaining 
members; the second is that, under a stable endogenous wage, newly created PCs can 
either be stable or unstable depending on the parameters of the model, but it is in 
general rather unlikely that PCs adopt a member-dismissal strategy. The survival of 
PCs in many industries, though affected by historical and institutional elements, may 
represent indirect empirical evidence for some of the results obtained here.^^
1.4 A  new  so lu tion  concept for transferable u tility  
norm al form  gam es
In recent years there has been a increased research into n-person cooperative games. 
The reasons for this are likely to be found in the growing interest in finding nonco­
operative foundations of cooperative games and in the endogenous coalition formation 
models.
A general problem, usually encountered by all economic applications of n-player 
cooperative games in which the payoff of every agent depends on the strategies of 
all agents, is certainly represented by the way in which the strategic (or normal) form 
game is converted into a game with the characteristic function having sensible features.
^^Case studies describing successful PCs’ birth and survival, are contained, for instance, in Jones 
(1975) and Cornforth et al. (1988) for the U.K., Bradley and Gelb (1987) for Mondragon, Spain, 
Estrin and Jones (1993) for French PCs, and Gunn (1984) for U.S. Co-operatives.
Indeed, these two topics seem to have proceeded togheter in the literature. About the topic of 
coalition formation, the major lines of research have proceeded in two main directions: on the one 
hand, the research for refinements of the concept of stability of coalition structures, as introduced in 
the seminal works by Thrall and Lucas (1963), Aumann and Drèze (1974), Shenoy (1979) and Hart 
and Kurz (1983) [see,for instance, Myerson (1991), Derks and Gillies (1995), Ray and Vohra (1997), 
just as examples of this approach]; on the other hand, the development of non-cooperative models both 
applied to the coalition formation problem as well as, in general, to n-cooperative games. Relevant 
contributions of this line of research are, among others, Selten (1981), Chatterje et al. (1993) and 
Moldovanu (1992). For accurate surveys of both topics, see Greenberg (1994) and Bloch (1997).
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Different conversions have been proposed, depending on the assumptions made about 
the behaviour of the players outside every deviating coalition in the strategic form 
game. Minmax or Maxmin behaviour assumed on the part of the outsider players give 
rise to the well known solutions labelled by Aumann (1967) a  and /?-core. In these 
conversions it is implicitly assumed that outside players react to a forming coalition 
either as followers or leaders, respectively. However, in meaningful strategic contexts 
(as, for instance, in oligopolistic games) there does not seem to be any rationale in 
assuming that external players adopt such drastic reactions (Minmax or Maxmin) when 
facing the formation of a coalition. This can explain why, other conversions of strategic 
form games have been proposed, as the 7  and Ô conversions, in which outside players 
react by playing à la Nash either sticking or breaking up into singletons, respectively. 
However, such conversions, although representing an advance in the solution of this 
problem, do not possess any temporal structures like that included in the Aumann’s 
a  and (3-coie described above. Conversely, it seems natural to assume that, when a 
coalition forms by playing a strategy in the underlying strategic game, the other players 
react by playing a strategy that is a reaction to the forming coalition’s strategy.
The fifth chapter of the thesis is devoted to reintroducing a natural temporal struc­
ture into the strategic form game that underlies a n-cooperative game. This temporal 
structure is just the usual conjecture of a Stackelberg duopoly model: when a player 
acts (the leader), it possesses a first-mover advantage with respect to the other player 
(the follower). Thus, the assumption is that whilst every forming coalition acts as a 
leader, the outside players react as followers according to their best-reply functions.
The introduction of this new assumption in the traditional 7  conversion, yields a 
new concept of solution, that is denoted here < -^core. The application of this solution 
concept to cartel formation in oligopoly and public good provision, gives rise to new 
results.
For the cartel formation game under linear Cournot oligopoly, it is shown that 
while the 7 -core yields a very large set of equilibrium allocations, under 0 -core the 
equilibrium allocation is unique. Moreover, small perturbation in the linearity of the 
functions, give rise to either no equilibrium or to multiple equilibria, respectively.
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Finally, for the economy with a public good, it is proved that the 7 -core allocation 
recently characterized by Chander and Tulkens (1997) are 0-core stable only if agents’ 
preferences are linear. Also here, it is proved that under non linearity of players’ utility 
functions, the set of 0 -core may well be empty.
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Chapter 2 
Earnings, Coalitions and the  
Stability of the Firm
2.1 In troduction
The idea of considering a firm as an opportunity or ’device’ through which a group 
of people can actively learn how to cooperate for the production of a commodity is 
certainly not new. Sometimes working together in the same place is just a technical 
necessity but more often it also improves the skill and the coordination necessary to 
obtain a more than ordinary result in production. The learning process produces a 
’network effect’ on what before was just a group of anonymous workers. This process 
probably requires a certain amount of time, e.g., if the firm starts producing at time 0 , 
after a certain period, at time 1 , the group has learned how to cooperate. One of the 
consequences of this process is that at the time 1 the firm can yield a surplus, equal 
to the difference between the money value of the firm’s production and the market 
prices of the factors. However, under complete information, the spot market for labour 
should reflect the value of such a surplus. Indeed, whenever a worker leaves the firm 
with or without his fellows, he could use his knowledge to set up a new firm in the 
market.
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The aim of this chapter is to explicitly model the workers’ decision to stay or to 
leave the firm in which they are employed, and to observe which firm’s stable earning 
profile raises as a resultd The main assumption of the model is that at the beginning 
two different groups of individuals exist in the economy: the entrepreneurs, endowed 
with a specific knowledge of a given industry production process and the workers, en­
dowed with just one unit of labour and without any knowledge about how to produce 
a commodity. However, once an entrepreneur decides to set up a firm in a given in­
dustry, he may need to hire a certain number of workers and these workers acquire a 
firm-specific skill. When this happens, every worker can bargain with the firm his com­
pensation, threatening to leave whenever, given his available outside options, the wage 
proposed by the entrepreneur is not satisfactory. Since the model assumes oligopolistic 
competition whithin each industry, in such a strategic environment every entrepre­
neur is sensitive to the possibility that employees leave their workplace setting up new 
competing production units. This simple feature of the model, permits to obtain some 
interesting results. On the one hand, an economy stable earning profile usually compre­
hends a vector of payments higher than the basic neoclassical (reservation) wage, also 
giving rise to pay differentials across industries, for initially homogeneous workers; on 
the other hand, this vector of payments depends on the relative degree of competition 
of the industry in which every firm operates. Moreover, the framework characterizes 
a stable earning profile as a particular case of core of an economy with coalitions of 
players behaving à la Nash in the product market. The equilibrium earning profile for 
the economy can in fact be proved to belong to such a solution set.
Among several bargaining models existing in the literature, at least two frameworks 
include the option for the employees to leave a firm becoming potential competitors. 
One, by Feinstein and Stein (1988), considers the behaviour of a firm that is aware of 
the potential danger of its employees’ know-how. In this model, the main answer of 
the firm is to hire more workers, thus yielding a sort of internal employees’ redundancy. 
Hence, the firm is able to lower the workers’ outside option and their threat point in 
the wage negotiation. The reduction of the employees’ competing firms value is then 
used as a device to moderate the employees’ wage demand.
^Throughout the paper this expression indicates a vector of payments received both by the em­
ployees and by the owners of a firm that respects certain stability requirements.
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Another model, by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), shows that when each worker’s 
reservation wage is private information, it might be the case that for leaving employees, 
even when convenient, finding an agreement on how to distribute their new firm’s value 
can be impossible. The reason for this result is the difficulty, in a multi-agent adverse 
selection setup, to implement a satisfactory agreement on a collective matter.
In two recent papers Stole and Zwibel (1996, 1997) apply an intra-firm multilateral 
bargaining framework with non binding agreements between a firm and its worker to 
yield an equilibrium level of wages and employment. By assuming complete irreplace- 
ability of each single worker, a stable (i.e. non renegotiable) earnings profile for the 
firm and the workers is characterized and proved to be equal to the Shapley value of 
the corresponding cooperative game. Two main assumptions seem responsible for their 
results. The first is the adoption of a decreasing returns of scale production function 
that modifies the usual split-the-pie bargaining solution by giving the firm an incen­
tive to hire more workers in order to reduce their marginal contractual power. The 
second is that the behaviour of the firm is substantially parametric when facing each 
employee’s departure. This feature basically implies that workers’ reservation wages 
are unaffected by every action subsequent their departure.
The model presented here, albeit through a different framework, takes a first step 
in the direction of explicitly modelling each worker’s outside option and looking at its 
consequences. The main assumption responsible for the model results, is basically one: 
after being hired by a firm, the workers dispose (for simplicity, instantaneously) of 
the necessary know-how to set up a new production unit. As a consequence, although 
the entrepreneurs can substitute without cost every departing worker with unemployed 
people, there is an indirect cost to be paid in terms of increased competition in the 
product market. This simple assumption permits to calculate a stable earning profile, 
that is, a not improvable payoff vector for all individuals of the economy.
In its basic structure the model can be considered as mainly heuristic. The idea 
that all employees of a firm can immediately acquire a specific ability to become en­
trepreneurs or partners of a new firm, without bearing the necessary setup costs, can 
appear a very extreme assumption. However, once some basic results are obtained, it
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would not be difficult introducing specific types of transaction costs that, by constrain­
ing each individual’s behaviour, could make the picture definitively more realistic.
The next section outlines the basic structure of the model. Section 2.3 introduces 
an application of the model describing the main results of the paper. Section 2.4 
is devoted to presenting in greater detail the game-theoretic nature of the solution 
concept adopted. Section 2.5 discusses some possible extensions of the model. Section 
2 .6  concludes the paper.
2.2 T he structure o f  th e  m odel
2 .2 .1  A  sim p le  o lig o p o listic  m u lti-sector  econ om y
This section describes a simple economy in which a finite set of individuals N  = 
{ l , 2 ,...,n}  is initially distributed among two subsets, such that N  = {{Ik}  U { /l} ) , 
where I k  represents the subset of entrepreneurs, while I I  indicates a subset containing 
homogenous workers. As anticipated above, a distinctive feature of the economy is 
that, at the beginning, each entrepreneur owns a specific knowledge of a given industry 
production process, while workers just possess a unit of labour to offer.^ For simplicity, 
it is assumed that every entrepreneur z E //c is allowed to set up just one firm by hiring 
a certain number of workers from the subset II .  A s a consequence of their lack of know­
how, the members of at least initially, cannot set up a firm without having first been 
recruited either by one member of I k ,  or by someone that has worked before with a 
member of 7/c, and so on. Let us assume m different specific know-how {I = 1, 2,..., m) 
and, for each one, k ’' entrepreneurs disposing from the beginning of this particular 
knowledge.^ Therefore, it turns out that, potentially, the initial number of firms in 
the economy can be equal to where is the transposed /-dimensional unitary
^This assumption is very strong but undoubtedly useful to describe an initial situation under which, 
it is not so relevant who detains the firms’ property rights, but who is entitled to start a business. 
^This means that each Z-th sector can comprehend a different number of entrepreneurs.
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vector and is the vector representing the number of entrepreneurs that disposes of 
the knowledge of the Z-th sector production process (Z =  1 , 2 ,
Since not necessarily all workers in I I  will be hired by one amongst the existing 
entrepreneurs, the potential number of coalitions in every initial coalition structure of 
the economy comprehends (v’^ k  ^+  1) coalitions (firms) denoted where j  =  1 , 2 , ...kK 
That is, in the economy there are m  sectors, each one with a certain number of firms 
{j = 1 , 2 , devoted to producing a homogeneous commodity yi. Furthermore, there 
is in general a coalition (that can also be empty) including all unemployed people that 
do not belong to any firm Denoting the set of all firms of industry I as =  
IJ 6 '^ % the set of all unemployed workers can be represented as U = N \  |J
j=l,..k  ^ 1=1,..,m
Let production for self-consumption be excluded, by requiring every commodity 
to be sold in the market. Let also each firm possess a continous and invertible 
production function specific to the industry gi :  ^R+ represented by:
2/i' — 9i ( )^ (2 -1)
where i  indicates the quantity of labour required to produce the commodity. This 
means that the number of workers hired by every firm 6 '^ ' will be decided by each 
entrepreneur according to the inverse function {Vji)) = | I I  LI |, where the
function {■) : R+ —^ N^. transforms every real number into its closest natural 
number.'^
Given the existing production function, every firm is assumed to compete à la 
Cournot in the l-th. homogeneous good market, with a payoff function ttji : R
given by:
'^Let us assume that, when a real number is exactly between two integers, the function (.) selects 
the lowest one.
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inverse demand function of the l - th.  sector
^  ^  ^ sure existence and uniqueness of a Cournot
the following assumptions will be considered
\ sector is a function of its own strategy and
I /  O  0  U IS in that sector:;
■m, compact and convex and, in particular, 
;sent every j-th  firm’s production boundary
Yj X > 9Î+, is tw ice continuously differ-
m of the multi-sector oligopolistic economy is
• such that, for every j  = 1, in that given
7T; {yj,y-j)  > Tf; , v% e y, andVj =
where y_j is the sum of all firm s’ output in a given industry minus j .
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It is well known that assumptions A.1-A.5 are sufficient to prove the existence of a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By A.3, every player’s payoff function is continuous in the 
strategy profile E I I  by A.4 and A.5, strictly concave on yji. By A.2 ,
firms’ strategy sets are non empty, compact and convex, so that existence of a Nash 
equilibrium follows.
Uniqueness is implied by A.4 and A.5 as follows. Since, for each firm, p"yj + p ' < 0 
and p' < 0, the function F  {yj,yi) =  p'yj is decreasing both in yj and yi. In fact,
=  p' < 0 and =  p”yj +  p' < 0 . Suppose now that in a given sector
there exist two Nash equilibria yj and yj. Suppose also, without loss of generality, that
k^
y j < yj. At a Nash equilibrium, p'pj + p  =  0, so that, if ^  pj < ^  p^, it follows from
3=1 3= 1
A.4 and A.5 th a t yj > yj for every j  = 1 ,.., leading to a contradiction.
The uniqueness of p* in each sector implies, in turn, that the multi-sector oligopolis­
tic economy has a unique Nash equilibrium.
In what follows, a further simplification will be made on the compensation system 
adopted by every firm. The initial reservation wage of unemployed workers, i.e., all 
i  E {{II}  n  {[/}), is equal to zero (because they cannot produce without first being 
recruited by a firm). Moreover, entrepreneurs are assumed to pay every recruited 
worker a share a\ of the firm’s surplus (2.2), where a\ E [0,1] is such that ^  =  1.^
ieS3^
Given such assumptions, it follows that for each coalition the surplus is given 
by (2.2) and is distributed according to the vector Moreover, assuming linear 
preferences for all individuals, the utility of every individual will be given by:
 ^Basically this feature of the model simplifies the problem when compared to the adoption of a fixed 
wage, without any particular loss of generality. Note also that, since firms are assumed symmetric in 
every Z-th industry, the share to be paid to workers will be the same in each j-th  firm of that industry 
and will be, therefore, indicated as
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n* =  ûi^ TTiz {yj i , yi ) , Vz e  { I l n  ,
1 ~  E  ] TTiJ {yjhyi) ,Vz € [ I k  n  5'^'} .
ielLnSJ  ^ J
2 .2 .2  T h e  s ta b ility  o f  an  earn ing  profile
Given the oligopolistic economy described above, a stable earning profile for the econ­
omy can be defined as a feasible vector of payments such that, given certain specific 
constraints for the individuals of the economy, anyone cannot improve upon. In our 
framework, given Nash equilibrium quantities, a stable earning profile is an income 
distribution within each firm such that none, individually or in a group, wants to leave 
the firm to form a new production unit.
In our economy, under the assumptions described above, every firm’s equilibrium 
surplus is given by:
TTji =  {tTjZ (2/jl ) 2/z )}v j= l,2 ,...,fc '
where y* represents the Nash equilibrium quantity vector of a Z-th industry. This 
vector also determines the partition of people belonging to I I  into two different groups: 
one group, denoted by D*, is the set of all employed workers at a Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
m k’ /  -1 \
D* = E  E  (5'^  {Vji) )j the other, conversely, is made of all unemployed workers
z=i j=l \ '
U = I l \ D * .  Assuming, for the time being, the existence at the Nash equilibrium of
a non empty set C/, in the economy there are many different choices available to each 
individual active in a firm. For every employee the choice is between:
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(la) staying in a firm and negotiating with the entrepreneur a share a\ of the firm’s 
equilibrium profit (2.4);
(2 a) leaving the firm (after having been trained) alone (or with other workers), to 
become entrepreneur of a new firm in the industry, by recruiting workers either from 
the same or from another firm (of the same industry), knowing that the entrepreneur 
in S '^' will recruit new workers from the set U according to their best-reply;
(3a) leaving the firm (after having been trained) to become self-employed, producing 
a certain amount of output (with only one unit of labour), given that existing firms 
will continue to produce according to their best-reply;
(4a) leaving the firm (after having been trained) with other firm’s workers to become 
member of a partnership, given the best-reply of existing firms;
(5a) entering the unemployed set, obtaining the initial reservation wage of the 
economy, equal to zero.
For each entrepreneur, apart from the choice to be self-employed and not to hire 
any worker, choices (la)-(5a) described above are similarly feasible. Therefore, in 
equilibrium, the entrepreneur will never earn less than his workers, otherwise he would 
deviate from the current situation setting up another firm.
Thus, an earning profile of the economy (a vector of remunerations for all individuals 
of the economy, denoted z ) can be viewed as stable if, given the partition of N  players 
into (v'^k^ 4- 1 ) coalitions (/c^  firms S '^' in each industry plus the unemployment set 
U) according to the Nash equilibrium quantity vector of every Z-th industry ?/*, no 
individual or group of individuals within each firm can improve upon z* G 
by deviating, where represents the vector of payments obtained in equilibrium 
within every Note that allowed deviations are as in (la)-(5a) above. Moreover, 
the behaviour of every complementary coalition, i.e. the individual in the set S ^^ \T ,
®By assumption unemployed people cannot autonomously setup firms and, therefore, cannot devi­
ate from z. Section 2.4 will describe in grater detail the game-theoretic setup on which is based the 
model.
33
(where T  indicates here a deviating coalition) is supposed to be which to carry on as 
before the deviation occurred, according to its best-reply. This is possible through the 
recruitment of a certain number of workers from the unemployment set U J  Moreover, 
note tha t only consistent deviations are considered, that is, deviations that cannot, in 
turn, be objected.
It is now time to describe the sufficient conditions for an earning profile z to be 
stable.
The Nash equilibrium quantity (and consequently the number oi I l employed in 
each is, by the symmetry of the equilibrium considered, identical for all existing 
firms in a given Z-th industry. Thus, the set of conditions making each firm’s earning 
profile stable can be characterized by a share of firm’s profits (equal by sym­
metry for all firms within an industry, so the superscript j  can be dropped) paid to all 
employees working for a firm, i.e., q!' = Ckj . In each Z-th sector, the equilib-
rium share a} can be determined through the respect of the following constraints:
a) No employee of a firm has to find convenient to become entrepreneur and setting 
up a new firm by hiring an optimal number of workers and paying them a share of the 
profit sufficient for them to stay. This condition holds when:
> ( ! _ « '  {k' +  . '  + 1 ))  TT-, {k' +  ^' +  l) (2.5)
^This behaviour is justifiable. In fact, suppose as a benchmark a constant returns to scale pro­
duction function like % =  for each j-th  firm, where ij  is the number of workers hired by each 
entrepreneur of a given sector. In this case, the equilibrium price of each market p{L*),  where
L* =  i j , \s not affected by transferring trained workers from a firm to another. So it easy to see 
j=i
that for a firm there is not any advantage in recruiting a worker that is already active in another 
firm. This would immediately be substituted by another unemployed worker and the firm’s equilib­
rium payoff would not change. Thus, at least in the case of constant returns to scale, firms’ Cournot 
behaviour after a deviation can be considered reasonable.
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where s' = • A£ji {k^)) = [k  ^ [ j^i (k^) — [k  ^+  l ) ) )  is the number of
firms (positive by assumptions A.4 and A.5) created by all workers involuntarily dis­
missed from any of the k  ^ firms as a result of the output reduction due to new firm’s 
entry; ( l — o;^  (/c^  -f +  l ) )  indicates the share of profit that the leaving worker, now 
entrepreneur, earns in the new firm; (/c^  4- s' 4- l)  represents the equilibrium payoff 
of every firm (now that the market includes (A:^  4- s' 4- l )  firms); (/c^ ) indicates each 
initial firm’s equilibrium payoff and
t e  (^0 ) =  1^^  (d''  ^ {Vji ( ^ 0 ) )}  I the Nash equilibrium number of
employees hired by every firm when the initial number of firms in the market stays as
it is. Note that, by symmetry, within each firm, {aj ~  - More­
over, note that when condition (2.5) holds, leaving the firm and becoming entrepreneur
is certainly not profitable for a group of workers (which obviously need to pay the resid­
ual group of recruited unemployed workers their equilibrium share) ;
b) No employee of a firm has to find convenient to become a member of a newly 
created partnership with some of the other firm’s employees. This condition holds 
when:
a'  (fc‘) ■ TT*, (k‘) ^  7t;, (fc‘ +  s" +  1)
!'•' {tj, (fc‘ ) )  "  - f "  %  ( t '  +  s" +  1) )   ^ ’
where RHS represents the equilibrium payoff of each member of a new partnership 
when a firm of this type (and then a number of induced new entrant firms, denoted s" 
) enters the market;
c) No employee of a firm has to find convenient to become self-employed:
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where E* is a self-employed’s equilibrium payoff (obtained assuming that only 1 
unit of labour is used) when a new firm of this type (and a number of induced new 
entrant firms, denoted s"') enters the market;
d) None of entrepreneurs operating in one of the existing industries has to earn 
less than each one of his employees. This corresponds to the condition:
e) No entrepreneur has to find convenient to be self-employed rather than hiring 
workers and sharing profit and knowledge with them, given that the other (identical) 
entrepreneurs of the industry will do the same (thus, giving rise to a self-employed 
equilibrium for that sector):
(1 -  a ' (fc‘)) TT*, {k‘) > E ’ {k‘) ; (2.9)
f) internal consistency:
( l — (^^)) ^ji ^  (l — (k  ^ +  5-1-1)) 7T*i (k^ +  5 +  l) , (2.10)
tha t expresses the fact that each entrepreneur has to find convenient to  pay his 
employees the equilibrium wage (characterized by the share (^0 ) i"^ther than let 
one (or more than one) employee(s) leaving in order to pay the newly recruited workers 
a lower equilibrium wage. However, note that conditions (2.5)-(2.8) always imply 
(2.10). In fact, when (2.5) is the tightest amongst (2.5)-(2.8), condition (2.8) directly 
implies (2.10). When, conversely, either (2.6) or (2.7) are the tightest constraint, (2.5) 
is respected with inequality and, again, (2.8) will imply (2.10). Moreover, due to the
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recursive nature of condition (2.5), a further assumption is needed. In fact, solving 
expression (2.5) would be like assuming that, at each round of entry, t = (1 ,...,T ), 
where T  represents the maximum number of entrants given that the set of unemployed 
is finite, the most profitable deviation for employees is always that expressed by choice 
(2a), i.e., to be entrepreneurs in a new firm. In order to avoid that an unprofitable 
option at a given round of entry becomes profitable in one of following rounds, then 
making expression (2.5) hard to solve, the following condition will be imposed in what 
follows.®
A .7  {No-crossing condition) Let « 2  0 3  he the share (/c^ ) that respect
condition (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), respectively, with equal sign. When, for a given number 
of existing firms k \  cd" {k^) = max { a i ,0 2^ , 0 3^}, the same condition holds for every 
{k  ^ 4- 1), for t = 1, . . . ,T.
Now, when a vector (/c^ ) =  {a^,a^, ...a^)  respects all conditions listed above, the 
corresponding earning profile of the economy z(a^ (^0 ) possesses some properties of 
stability. Using (2.5)-(2.10) and given an arbitrary initial number k^  of firms existing 
in each industry, the proposition that follows characterizes the vector a   ^ associated to 
the stable earning profile z(o^) for the economy. Let us, for ease of notation, denote 
{£ji {k^)) as îji {k^).
P roposition  1 Under no-crossing condition and for a given number of entrepreneurs 
(and firms) existing in every industry, a stable earnings profile of the economy is char­
acterized by the following share of profit in every of a given industry:
_  t=i______  V  ^ ' h=i^   V h=o ^ \  ^ ' h=o^  ■'_____________
-  ^ )
and of-* < , u;/ien Qi =  max {«i, 0 2 , « 3} ;
*The following section will show how to remove this simplifying assumption.
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when Q2 =  max { a [ , a 2, ag} ,
^ 1 7r;,(fc') 7r;j(fc')?*,(fc‘+AF;,(fc')+A2?;,(fc'+i)+2)
I  (iH*o ’ J ~  4 (^ 0
when Œ2 = max , 022, ag j
n  ^  7r;,(&'+AZ;,(A:0+l) %(A') _  (&'+A%(&')+A^^Q,(A'+l)+z)%(&')%(A'+A/),(&')+l)
1 7r;j(fc') 7T*,(fc')
P ro o f. When a\ =  max {oi, 0 2 , Og}, in order for z to be stable, a^ * must respect 
condition (2.5) with equality. The solution can be obtained by iteratively solving the 
differential equation contained in (2.5) for o!" (/c )^, by assuming a number of potential 
entrants t = T . This is the maximum number of available entrants, given that the set 
of I I  is finite. Note that, for t = (1, ...T — 1), we indicate with
A %  {k‘ + t + l ) =  tji {k‘ + t ) -  %  {k‘ + t + 1) the number of workers dismissed
by every firm at each round of entry as a consequence of the output reduction.
Thus, the solution of constraint (2.5) is exactly the first expression shown in propo­
sition 1. It has to be noticed that when a ’'* = 0!i, no coalition of workers would have 
any incentive to become entrepreneur of a new firm. In fact, the share of a new firm’s 
profit should be divided amongst all deviating workers, ensuring, consequently, for each 
one of them, a level of earning lower than a \*.
When the best workers’ outside option is characterized by Q2 (corresponding to 
the option to create a partnership), the whole problem must be modified to take into 
account that, in the iterative solution of (2.5), the best outside option for the employees 
working in the new entrepreneurial firm created at the first round of entry is now 
represented by the share CK2 . Provided this, a i must include « 2  in the second an last 
round of entry, thus yielding as expressed above. Note that Q2 is the solution of 
constraint (2.6). The same procedure yields a'/, when the best workers’ outside option is
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which to be self-employed (corresponding to the share 0 3 ). Moreover, as shown above, 
the difference equation (2.10) is always respected when a ’* respects constraints (2.5)-
(2.9). Thus, the initial entrepreneurs will always find convenient to pay their employees 
the equilibrium share of the profit a ’'* (/c^ ) rather than risk their departure and increase 
the existing market competition. Finally, the LHS expressions in rows fourth and sixth 
(within the min parentheses) above, represents the solution of constraints (2 .8 ) and
(2.9), ensuring tha t every entrepreneur does not have any incentive to deviate or to 
give rise to a self-employment equilibrium. When these inequalities hold, provided that 
constraints (2.5)-(2.7) are satisfied, entrepreneurs will never find convenient either to 
set up a new firm as entrepreneur, partner or self-employed, or to be self-employed 
from the beginning. In general then, given the partition of the economy determined 
by the Nash equilibrium, when the vector a* = (a^*, respects the condition 
above, the corresponding economy earning profile:
z(a*) =
Vie(/i,n5*='.')
for Z =  1, . . 771, and j  = , is stable.
The main aim of Proposition 1 is which to exactly characterizes a stable earning 
profile z(a*) for the economy. W hat the proposition shows is that, under simple sta­
bility conditions, each firm will find convenient to offer the workers a compensation 
sufficiently high to keep them inside the firm. This compensation - expressed as a 
share of every firm’s profit - has to be high enough to prevent even the finest firm’s 
sub coalition, represented by a single worker, to have an incentive to setup a new firm 
in the form of an entrepreneurial, partnership or self-employed type of unit through 
the recruitment of the available workforce.
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2.3 M od el applications
2 .3 .1  A  lin ear ex a m p le
In order to present the features of a stable earning profile, let us introduce a simple 
one-industry example. For simplicity, let the production function of every firm be linear 
in the number of workers, that is, =  7  • ,^ for 7  > 0. In order to make calculations 
even simpler, let p (F) =  a — p be a linear inverse demand for a homogeneous good,
k
where y = YltVj represents the total quantity of the good sold in the market, with
G  >  >  O '
j = l












TTj (k‘ +  S" +  1) o2
(*+7(fc+l)(fc+2)+2)
7T*- (fc'+s" + l) 07
(*-+7(t+l)(t+2) '=)
E* (k) (a -  j k )
E] {k‘ + s'" + 1) f  aj -k- j^  V (*+1) /
T a b . 2.1 - E q u ilib r iu m  v a lu e s  for th e  lin ea r  e x a m p le
In the picture below, it is presented a numerical simulation.
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fig.3.1 - Values of 0 2 , 0 :3 , 0 4 , 05 
{ a = 250, 7  =  10) for A: = 1, ...10.
The picture shows the values of Oi, 0 2 , 0 3 , for a given number of initial (entre­
preneurs) firms existing in the industry {k = 1, ...10). It can be noticed that, for the 
values of parameters selected and for a given range of A;, Q2 is the maximum value among 
0 ^,0 2 , 0 3 , therefore constituting the equilibrium share of profit that every firm has to 
paid to all its employees. Moreover, as the picture shows, for (A: = 1, ..7), 02 respects 
the constraint that imposes that each employee has to earn less than his entrepreneur 
(with a corresponding share denoted 0:4) and that no entrepreneur has to prefer to 
be self-employed (with a corresponding share denoted 0:5). However, for A: > 7, this 
constraints no longer holds, and (for such numbers of initial firms) a self-employment 
equilibrium can be expected to raise as a result. This indicates that, under the para­
meters selected , for A: > 7, the stable earning profile characterized by proposition 1 is 
not stable. When, conversely, for a given number of initial entrepreneurs, a* respects 
Qs but not Q4, it is the internal consistency requirement that does not and new firms 
can be expected to enter the market. Again, this means that for the parameters values, 
the partition of players into k coalitions characterized by proposition 1, is not stable.
In the figure below we plot the equilibrium earning z {a* (k)) for each employee, 
according to the equilibrium share represented in figure 3.1. It can be noticed that, in
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general, apart from the case in which the initial number of firms is very low, z (a* (k)) 




F ig ,3 .2 - E a c h  e m p l o y e e ’s e q u i l ib r iu m  r e m u n e r a t io n  z ( q * )  (fc=l,..10).
T his is a rather general result of the m odel th at describes th e fact th at, since  
workers’ ou tside option  varies w ith  any initial partition of the econom y (when th is  
con stitu tes an equilibrium , in our exam ple for 1<  k <  7), the corresponding equi­
librium com pensation  of each em ployee changes according to  the value o f his firm ’s 
market share. W hen either the size of the market (represented by the param eter a), 
or the num ber o f firms in the econom y increase, equilibrium  em ployees’ com pensation  
decreases. T h e reason is that, since workers’ training is specific to  a firm of a certain  
industry, each worker can negotiate a share o f firm’s profit by using th e threat o f se t­




F ig .  3 .3  - E m p l o y e e s  e q u i l ib r iu m  c o m p e n s a t i o n  in tw o  d i f feren t  s ize  i n d u s t r i e s
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This makes possible the existence of an equilibrium earning profile characterized by 
different levels of compensation for individuals that, although homogeneous, work in 
different industries. The figure above, for instance, represents the equilibrium earnings 
for employees working in two industries (Z =  1 , 2 ) characterized by a different market
size.
2 .3 .2  R em o v in g  th e  no-crossing  con d ition
In the previous section, in order to characterize a stable earning profile of the economy, 
the model imposed, for simplicity, a special condition on the shares solving constraints
(2.5)-(2.7), denoted no-crossing condition (assumption A.7). This was a simple way 
to avoid tha t at a given round of entry t, the value of one share became higher than 
the others, after having been lower in the previous rounds. Thus, such a condition 
is just a way to simplify the characterization of a stable earning profile that, due to 
constraint (2.5) presents an iterative nature. However, numerical simulations show 
that it may well be possible that the values of the shares representing different outside 
options intersect during the T  rounds of entry considered in the iterative solution of
(2.5). This is not a problem as long as the share that at a given round represents the 
best employees’ outside option is inserted into the iterative solution of (2.5) exactly at 
that stage (that then becomes the last stage). For instance, when at a given round t, 
ûi2 represents employees’ best outside option, the expression for a^ * = Qj presented in 




Similarly, the share 0:3 needs to be plugged into expression above when, at a given 
round t, such a share becomes the maximum among the shares obtained solving con­
straints (2.5)-(2.7). Let the corresponding values of a^ * be denoted as a f  and o f ,  where 
t stands for the round in which or o^, respectively, becomes higher than a^.
2.4 T h e gam e-th eoretic  nature o f  a stab le earning  
profile
This section briefly outlines the game-theoretic nature underlying the model presented 
above. Here the purpose is mainly to show that the stable earning profile described in 
the previous section can be characterized through a cooperative game-theoretic setting. 
In particular, it will be shown that the vector belongs to the core of a partition
function game obtained starting with a set of players partitioned into entrepreneurs 
and workers.
Firstly, some basic notions are introduced in order to illustrate the results obtained 
in this section.
2 .4 .1  G a m e and  eq u ilib riu m  con cept
Let us introduce the necessary tools to describe the game. In general we can start with 
a normal form game,
r  =  ({wi, (2 -1 1 )
where N  is the (finite) players set, X{ is the strategy set of player z, and X s  is 
the strategy set of a coalition of players S  Ç. N . Let p{N)  be the set of all feasible
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partitions p  of the players set N] let Xp denote the set Xs ,  for any p G p{N).  The
Sep
set X  = IJ Xp is the set of all possible outcomes (in terms of strategies) of the game 
pep{N)
r .  The function Ui : X  represents players’ preferences. We will limit ourselves
to the case of transferable utility functions Ui.
We first describe the set of permissible partitions that can be induced in the game. 
We start with an initial partition of the players’ set N  into two different subsets, 
N\  and N 2, with identical players within each subset, formed in this way:
(2 .12)
such that, for every i , j  E N\ ,  {%} H {j} =  0, and such that (A^ i U N 2 ) = N .
Therefore, the initial partition p^ includes every z 6  A^ i as singleton and the set of
players N 2. From this initial partition, through the choice of a strategy, every player
i E Ni  can induce any coalition S' Ç TV, such that:
a ' =  U { W c  % } )  (2.13)
in which a player i E Ni  merges with a subset (that can also be empty) of N 2. 
Therefore, the induced partition p^ is:
p ' =  . ( % \  ( %  n  , (2.14)
where every S* can also be formed by just a single player i  E Ni.  Again, from p^ a 
new partition can be induced through the strategy of any T^, such that:
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r>  = ( { s '  c  { y }u{w^<z ( % \  } ) (2.15)
i.e., formed by any subset E of S'* and a subset (also empty) of excluded players 
still belonging to N2. Let every subsequent partition ...p^ be induced in the same
way, i.e.,
T2 =  ({Ef C T^} U VL )^, =  ({Ef c  U T ' =  ({E* C u  {VL'}),
where are all subsets of N 2 (until there are available players).
Let S  (N) denote the family of all coalitions formed in the way described above,
while pT (N) denotes the set of all correspondent partitions (that also includes in each
round the players remained in N 2). Let, for every coalition S € O' (A^ ) the strategy set
be X s  =  n  Moreover, let the above sequence of partitions be induced by every S  
ies
E Q (N) through the choice of a Nash strategy, given that all other coalitions in the 
correspondent induced partition p E p r  {N) react noncooperatively according to their 
best-reply. Let us also assume that a unique vector of Nash equilibrium strategies 
always exists. Thus, following the conversion of partition function games originally 
proposed by Ichiishi (1981) and later used by Ray and Vohra (1997), we can uniquely 
define the worth of a coalition S  in every correspondent induced partition p E C  (TV), 
as the aggregate utility of its members in the Nash equilibrium between that coalition 
(acting as a single player) and the other coalitions, also acting noncooperatively with 
respect to  all other coalitions. That is:
(2.16)
ies
where x* is a vector of strategies such that, for every S  E p^
ies ies ies
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D efin itio n  2 The vector of strategy x*for all coalitions belonging to the corresponding
partition p^ G Pt (N),  (j = l, . . . t) is consistently core-stable if  there not exists any
coalition S' G S  {N) such that v ^  (x*), where G p r  is the new
i e s
partition induced by S  fromp^, and the new vector of strategy is not, in turn, objectable 
in the same way. When such a x* exists, we define the correspondent p* G p r  (N) as 
a core-stable coalition structure.
R e m a rk  1 The concept of stability introduced above presents some similarities with 
the ”equilibrium binding agreement” recently introduced by Ray and Vohra (1997). The 
main differences are that the authors allow all consistent deviations that make the initial 
partition finer and, usually, the initial coalition structure is the grand coalition.
2 .4 .2  S ta b le  earn ing  profile and  co re-sta b ility
Having defined the game-theoretic setup required for the analysis, we can now apply 
it to the definition of a stable earning profile. We restrict our attention to just one 
industry of the economy described in section 2 .2 .1 , since the analysis can easily be 
extended to an economy with m  sectors. Starting with a set of players N  = (/* U //,)
partitioned as in (2.12), we allow every i E I k  to select a Nash strategy to form a 
coalition as in (2.13), thus inducing a partition as which expressed in (2.14), given that 
the all other coalitions act noncooperatively according to their best-reply. From this 
partition on, every coalition
47
can induce new partitions as those described above. The underlying normal form 
game F can thus be defined in the following way. In every partition p E p r  {N ), for each 
player i E I r  or i E {E C S*) or again, for every player i E {T^ C {j = 1,2,..., Z),
the strategy set is:
Xi = {vi E R+ : Vi < ÿ i < 00} = Yi,
where pi represents an output choice; conversely, for every player in N 2 or in any of
the subsets C N 2, {j = 1, 2,..., i) used to form a new coalition T \  the strategy set 
is defined as follows:
X i = [yes, no) .
This means that under a given partition E p r  {N), every i G / l  is just allowed to
express his agreement to participate in a coalition S  E Q {N). However, once in S, 
every i E I I  becomes able, either as singleton or with other players in 6 ", to deviate 
and form a new coalition belonging to 0= [N).
Let the preferences of every player in S  E ^  {N) be linear in profit and expressed 
by the function:
Ui = aiTTs ivs^y-s),
where E [0,1] is such that ^  =  1. For every coalition S  E ^  let the strategy
ies
set be:
X s  = < {xs,Ois) : X5 e  J J X i  and as = (a i,..a s)  : =  1 >
I ies ies J
where CKg is a vector of shares within every S. It follows that, given a partition 
p E Pt  (-/V), the worth of a coalition S  is given by:
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{ S , p )  =  { y s , y ~ s )  =  { y s , y - s )
i e s
where y*_g is the Nash equilibrium vector of quantities of all other coalitions in the 
induced partition p, minus S. We are now ready to present the main results of this 
section. These are that, starting from proposition 1 and definition 2, two consistently 
core-stable equilibria can be characterized, with, associated, two different core-stable 
coalition structures.
P ro p o s itio n  2 (Self-employment equilibrium) When, under the initial partition p^, 
the following condition holds
as < max {«1, 0 :2 , 0 :3} , (2.18)
where a \ must be replaced, depending on the different circumstances described in propo­
sition 1 and section 2.3.2, with o ;j,a ï, o ;f, o ;f, respectively, the vector
~  {{{yi}\fi£iK ’ consistently core-stable and the partition p^ E
pT { ^ )  the core-stable coalition structure for the economy.
P ro o f. By proposition 1, when expression (2.18) is satisfied, the constraint (2.9) 
does not hold and no player z G 7/c in the initial partition p^ has any incentive to 
induce the new partition p^ by merging with a subset of J^. Therefore, every i  E 
I k  will select a Nash equilibrium output as singleton. Since all players i  E I k  are 
identical (because we are treating a one-industry case), they will all do the same, 
thus receiving a payoff equal to v ({Ovîg/x (2/Z,2/-%), where, for each i E Ik ^
Oii = 1. Hence, the correspondent consistently core-stable vector of strategy will be 
X* = (({ rflig /^  , ) l)- Note that in this case the strategy selected by players
in I I ,  Xi E [yes,no), is irrelevant, because, no player i E I k  will be willing to recruit 
them, irrespective of their choice, and, hence, the equilibrium payoff of every i  E I I  
will be equal to zero. Consequently, the corresponding partition p^ = , I l ) j  is
the core-stable coalition structure of the economy. ■
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P ro p o s itio n  3 (Capitalistic economy equilibrium) When, under the initial partition 
p^, the following conditions hold:
min {0 4 , 0 5 } > max {0 1 , 0 2 , 0 3 } , (2.19)
with Qi that can also be equal to a\,OL[,o!{ , respectively, depending on the different
cases considered in proposition 1 and section 2.3.2, the vector of strategies,
’ iy^^h ie iL )  ’ ~
is consistently core-stable and the partition p^ G Pt {N), is the economy core-stable
coalition structure.
P ro o f. By proposition 1 , when the LHS of condition (2.19) holds, the constraint (2.9) 
is satisfied and every player in I k  has an incentive to induce from a new partition 
through a Nash equilibrium choice of output. This new partition is p^ G P t{ N ),  and 
involves to recruit players from the subset I i .  Since all i E I k  are identical, they will all 
take the same choice. From proposition 1 we also know that when LHS of (2.19) holds, 
also constraint (2.10) is satisfied, and every i E I k  will prefer to pay the recruited 
workers i E I I  ^ sufficient share rather than let them induce a new partition p^ G 
Pt {N).  When one of members of RHS of (2.19) constitutes the maximum amongst 
shares in parenthesis, any allowed subcoalition of is indifferent whether to induce 
from p^ a new partition p^ through the choice of a consistent strategy or just stay 
where it is. Hence, given the vector of Nash equilibrium quantities, denoting with a* 
the share described in proposition 1 , the consistently core-stable vector of shares will 
be, by symmetry, a* =  for alH G (/^ Pi 5'*), and (1 — a*) for every i E {Ik E\ S^).
Moreover, the Nash equilibrium strategy for every player in 7  ^H will be which
to accept to merge with i.e., ~  since the only alternative
would be to receive a zero payoff by being unemployed. Again, the strategy of every 
excluded player i E I l \  irrelevant for the stability of the vector of strategies.
Thus, the correspondent partition p^ = ({'S'^Ivîg/^ , I l \  {II P induced from
50
through the strategy choice of every i E is the economy core-stable coalition 
structure. ■
The two propositions above describe two among the many institutional equilibria 
that, given the initial partition of players and given all allowed inducible partitions, 
can arise in the economy.
2.5 D iscussion
2 .5 .1  T h e  case o f  fu ll (or near full) em p loym en t
Section 2.2 has described all possible deviations available to players under the assump­
tion that in the economy a non empty set of unemployed workers exists in equilibrium. 
When, conversely, this set does not contain enough people to replace every deviating 
coalition of workers, some further comments are necessary. In particular, for all model 
shares of profit (described in proposition 1) that do not require an iterative process of 
firms’ entry (cases in which either or are the best employees’ outside options), 
the number of equilibrium unemployed required for the correspondent earning profile 
of the economy to be stable is very low. When, conversely, the best employees’ outside 
option possesses an iterative nature (as in the case of a^), numerical simulations show 
that a certain number of unemployed workers may be required for the corresponding 
share to converge. When, given the initial number of firms, the set of unemployed 
U is too small for to converge, the best employees’ outside option is usually too 
high to be sustained as a stable earning profile for the economy. However, since in all 
cases considered equilibrium workers’ compensation is higher than initial reservation 
wages, the existence of an unemployment set could be a rather plausible situation of 
the economy. However, what basically the model outlines is that, in a strategic market 
environment, the unemployment can be characterized as an equilibrium phenomenon, 
that in the model simply depends upon the different initial knowledge of entrepreneurs 
and workers.
51
2 .5 .2  T h e  ca se  o f  fixed  w ages
Section 2.2 has assumed a profit-sharing type of compensation for workers. This fea­
ture of the model simplifies the analysis, by making the Nash equilibrium vector of 
output unaffected by the share of profit a  assigned to workers. When this assump­
tion is removed and workers receive fixed wages, the equilibrium can be described 
by a pair {w* {k^)) ,UL* (^0 ) ’ representing economy equilibrium quantities and 
wages, respectively. Since now each firm’s output choice depends on the level of wages, 
a temporal structure has to be introduced in the model to represents every firm’s Nash 
equilibrium output choice conditional on wages. However, simple specifications of the 
model show that, in general, the qualitative features of the analysis remain very close 
to those described in the model presented above.^
2 .5 .3  T h e  e x is te n c e  o f  a se tu p  cost
The model presented assumed absence of setup costs for every active firm in the econ­
omy. However, without credit constraints, the existence of a fixed cost borne by every 
company does not change the nature of the model results more than it does a change in 
the parameters values. Numerical simulations show that, for symmetric setup costs in 
every sector, there usually exist a range of k'' for which employees’ best outside options 
are negatively affected by setup costs and a range of k ’ for which they are, conversely, 
positively affected.
2.6 C onclud ing rem arks
This chapter has described an oligopolistic economy in which each worker recruited 
by a firm obtains a firm-specific skill. This skill enables him, potentially, to leave the
^The next chapter will consider a noncooperative version of the model presented here, assuming 
though that employees are paid with fixed wages.
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firm in which is employed to set up a new firm in the same industry. By carefully 
defining the conditions needed to ensure that, given the initial partition of existing 
players, no individual in the economy wants to change his situation through a feasible 
deviation, a stable earning profile for the economy has been characterized. The levels 
of workers’ remunerations associated to this earning profile present two features: they 
are higher than neoclassical reservation wages (that in the model are equal to zero); 
they are sensitive to the size of firms’ market shares and hence, to the number of firms 
operating in equilibrium in each industry. Moreover, given the initial players’ partition 
and given a sequence of feasible deviations allowed to each coalition of players and 
under the assumption of noncooperative behaviour across coalitions, the model has 
shown tha t the stable earning profile can be sustained as a consistently core-stable 
vector of strategies.
Two extensions of the present model (not developed in any of next chapters) would 
be worthwhile of further exploration. One is to let the typology of the firms initially 
existing in the economy (entrepreneurial, self-employed, or partnership alike) be com­
pletely endogenous. This extension would imply to build a fully developed theory of the 
firm formation togheter with a theory of the stability of an earning profile as the one 
presented here A second line of analysis would be which to extend the allowed players’ 
deviations to coalitions of agents belonging to different firms and/or to introduce dif­
ferent constraints meant to describe different bargaining processes and (possibly) more 
realistic institutional setups of the economy.
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Chapter 3 
M anagers’ Com pensation and  
Collusive Behaviour under Cournot 
O ligopoly
3.1 In trod u ction
Usually the outside option of companies executives officers (CEOs) and, in general, 
of highly trained workers, takes the form of alternative offers made by other (often 
competitor) firms. This form of at-will employment does not necessarily mean that 
each company is completely vulnerable to the disclosure of its strategic informations 
after the CEOs’ departure. Trade Secret Acts (like the Uniform TSA in U.S.), corporate 
policies on trade secrets as well as postemployment restrictive covenants, such as non 
disclosure and nonsolicitation agreements, are all tools that large companies adopt to 
avoid a too great tem ptation for CEOs and other important employees to walk off 
stealing company’s informations.^
However, there are well known cases in which CEOs decide to leave their company to 
set up independent business, mainly as a result of a solid organizational and managerial
^See, for instance, the recent case study ’’When an Executive Defects”, Harvard Business Review, 
January-February 1997, pp. 18-34.
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experience acquired in the field. In fact, in industries in which a relatively small 
number of cutthroat competitors control most of the market, a noncompete clause 
cannot realistically be imposed on executives. It might be either too expensive for the 
guaranteed contracts that senior officers would demand if asked to accept it, or it might 
simply be an uncommon practise in the industry. Moreover, when CEOs set up new 
ventures based on their organizational and market experience, companies do not really 
have grounds for a good lawsuit. It can be difficult to achieve evidence from which a 
court can infer that either customer lists, pricing and marketing plans or simply the 
company organizational style have been stolen.
The relevance of the outside option or ’’going rate” in affecting executives’ pay 
is empirically recognized [see, for instance. Smith and Szymanski (1995)].^ CEOs’ 
defection to set up independent businesses can be considered more likely in industries 
in which fixed costs are not particularly high and the company’s experience is easily 
duplicable. Whether the answer of existing firms’ owners should be, on the one hand, 
that of increasing the existing market competition - to reduce the value of potential 
entrants - on the other it may simply be that of adopting a collusive output choice 
as a result. In any case, whenever the company’s environment naturally discloses 
strategic informations to a few firm’s insiders, executives’ pay should be responsive of 
the existing outside options and hence, of the features of the market in which the firm 
operates.
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the existence of a concrete outside 
option for firms’ executives can induce, under specific circumstances, every firm to 
adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the chapter characterizes the condi­
tions under which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than 
in a standard Cournot model. It is also shown that room may exist for implicit per­
fect and stable collusive agreements among firms. Other interesting findings are also 
twofold. Firstly, that the equilibrium executives’ pay will usually be dependant upon 
the number of companies initially disposing of the knowledge required to set up the 
business. Secondly, that companies’ procedures difficult to duplicate can constitute a 
beneficial form of competition policy, by inducing the firms to behave less collusively in
^Related empirical works on managers’ pay and firms’ performance are, amongst others, Murphy 
(1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Gregg et al. (1993).
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the product market. This is because firms are less worried to lose their informational 
advantages in favour of potential defecting firm’s insiders.
Different setups related to this topic are contained, among the others, in Fenstein 
and Stein (1988), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Stole and Zwiebel (1997). The 
results presented in this paper can also be compared to the well known (and opposite) 
result [Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987)] that under Cournot 
oligopoly the presence of managers’ incentives related to sales can induce each company 
to behave less collusively than simple entrepreneurial firms (i.e., which managed by just 
the owner).
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly presents the game- 
theoretic structure of the model. Section 3.3 introduces a simple model specification to 
show the main paper findings. Section 3.4 analyses the effect of including a fixed cost 
in the model. Section 3.4 is devoted to extend some of the results to a more general 
framework. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 T h e  stru ctu re o f  th e  m odel
The model describes an oligopolistic industry in which, at the beginning, only n agents 
(indicated as business initiators) possess the knowledge to produce a commodity with 
a given technology. To be effective, the technology requires both skilled and unskilled 
workers. Such an exclusive knowledge represents the only barrier to entry for other po­
tential competitors (for instance the skilled workers, henceforth labelled as managers) 
assumed to need a specific on-the-job training to start a new business. Thus, in the in­
dustry, the n  initiators are assumed to set up n  (identical) firms behaving à la Cournot 
and producing a homogenous commodity y. The sequence of strategies described in the 
model is quite simple. Firstly, every n -th company decides how much commodity to 
produce (and thus, how many identical managers to hire), according to the usual profit 
maximization procedure. Secondly, the company has to fix each manager’s remunera­
tion, indicated as v. Hence, a manager recruited by the firm can either decide to stay, 
accepting u, or leave, to set up a competing company in the industry, thus earning a
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profit of at most vr (n +  1). Every manager that has set up a firm continues the game 
exactly as before (i.e., first deciding y and then v for her or his recruited managers) 
and the game goes on in this way, with a potentially infinite number of stages. The 
solution concept used to solve the game is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The 
definition that follows describes in detail an equilibrium of the game.
D efinition 3 An equilibrium of the game is a vector of quantities,
{yl {v* {n + k) ,n  + k) ,y^ {v* {n k) ,n  + k ) ,..., 2/^+* {v* {n k) ,n  + k ) ) , 
where v* represent every manager’s equilibrium compensation and k the number of 
new firms entered the market in equilibrium, such that, for every i — th  firm, for  
i = 1,2, ...,n  + k, whatever the number of entrants {k = 0 , 1 ,..., oo), it must be that:
TTi [y* (y (n +  /c)) (v (n +  k))] > tt^ {v {n +  k)) ,y*_- {v {n +  k))] (3.1)
and,
TTi [y* {y* {n -h k )) , y*_i {v* {n +  A:))] > tt^  [y* {v {n +  k)) , y*_^  {v* {n +  k))] (3.2)
while, for each manager recruited by a firm,
V* {n -\-k )>  7Ti [yi (u (n +  /c +  1)), (u (n +  /c +  1 ))] (3.3)
where in all expressions above, y-i indicates the vector of quantity selected by all 
firms different from firm  i and, for ease of notation, y i(y {n-{- k)) stands for  
2/i (u (n +  /l) , n +  k) for any i and any k.
Definition 2 imposes three conditions on an equilibrium of the game. Firstly, that no 
firm must find profitable to change its selected quantity (condition 3.1); secondly, that, 
given the quantity chosen, no firm must have an incentive to change managers’ equi­
librium compensation (condition 3.2); thirdly, that every hired manager must prefers 
to stay within the firm rather than setup a new business, otherwise the game would 
continue and an equilibrium would not be reached (condition 3.3). It has to be noticed 
that the solution concept adopted here focuses on individual players’ behaviour and
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excludes collective deviations from equilibrium.^ The figure below depicts the game 
strategy sequence.
n-imtiator» (f 1,2... v »)
v(n)
A manager o f  firm i
Stay
A manager o f  a (rH-I)-th firm
Stay Leave
(it continue»)
F ig .2.1 - T h e  gam e structure
Definition 2 imposes three conditions on an equilibrium of the game. Firstly, that no 
firm must find profitable to change its selected quantity (condition 3.1); secondly, that, 
given the quantity chosen, no firm must have an incentive to change managers’ equi­
librium compensation (condition 3.2); thirdly, that every hired manager must prefers 
to stay within the firm rather than setup a new business, otherwise the game would 
continue and an equilibrium would not be reached (condition 3.3). It has to be noticed
^Moreover, it has to be noticed that, due to the nature of the problem, the type of equilibrium 
is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. In fact, at each fc-th stage, every firm decides its best 
strategy assuming that in all following stages new entrant firms will select exactly their equilibrium 
strategy. Finally, note that all stages included in the game are not meant to represent time, but rather 
a chain of two-stage strategies happening simultaneously.
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that the solution concept adopted here focuses on individual players’ behaviour and 
excludes collective deviations from equilibrium.'^ The figure below depicts the game 
strategy sequence.
The next section applies the equilibrium definition to a simple model specification, 
in order to show its main results.
3.3  A  sim ple exam ple
Let us assume that in a certain industry n  agents, initially disposing of the knowledge 
on how to produce a homogenous commodity y, decide to set up n  (identical) firms 
behaving à la Cournot. Let also the technology available to them be described by the 
following Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale production function:
yi =  m ^ ' (^1-^ ) (3.4)
where respectively m  is the number of managers (or highly skilled workers) recruited 
by every i-th firm (i = 1, ...n) while i  is the number of unskilled workers. Let us assume, 
for simplicity, that 0 = 1/2. Let also every firm’s fixed cost be equal to zero. W ithout 
loss of generality, the wage paid to unskilled workers is normalized to one, while v 
denotes each manager’s compensation. Moreover, let the market demand be linear and 
equal to:
p ( y ) = n - y  (3.5)
^Moreover, it has to be noticed that, due to the nature of the problem, the type of equilibrium 
is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. In fact, at each fc-th stage, every firm decides its best 
strategy assuming that in all following stages new entrant firms will select exactly their equilibrium 
strategy. Finally, note that all stages included in the game are not meant to represent time, but rather 
a chain of two-stage strategies happening simultaneously.
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where Y  = y i represents the total quantity of commodity delivered to the market.
Z=1
Deriving by (3.4) every firm’s cost function as:
Q  [Ui) = 2>A • Vi (3.6)
it is straightforward to get every initial 2-th firm’s Cournot equilibrium quantity 
(for any arbitrary managers’ compensation) as:
(3.7,
and every 2-th firm’s equilibrium profit as:
(a — 2 y^)
<  (") -  {n + 1)2
As explained above, the basic feature of the model is that, when managers are 
hired by a firm, they immediately acquire the specific knowledge to become potential 
competitors of the existing firms. Hence, managers’ compensation must be optimally 
decided by a firm knowing each manager’s potential threat of leaving to setup, through 
the use of unskilled workers and other managers, a new production unit. When a 
manager leaves the firm, he or she will presumably set up a company of the same type 
as the one she or he is working for. Thus, if in the previous stages of the game k firms 
have entered the market, from (3.8), the payoff of a leaving manager is at most equal 
to:^
(^ a — 2y/v {n + k 1 )^ 
(n -t" /c T 2)
TVi (n k 1) —--------- -— I—■— --------  (3.9)
simplyfyng assumption made here is that the exit of one manager and the consequent creation 
of a new firm determines a trascurable reduction in the equilibrium number of managers’ hired by all 
other firms. However, to include this effect and the induced entry of new firms does not change at all 
the nature of the model results.
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where v{n-{- k + 1) represents the wage that the leaving manager will pay to her 
or his managers. Expression (3.9) it is built under the presumption that every existing 
firm whose manager(s) has decide to leave, can easily find a substitute. As it will 
become clear later, such a managers’ availability can either be assumed (case 3 .3 .1), or 
it is something endogenously generated by the model (case 3.3.2).®
Now, we can apply definition 1 to find managers’ equilibrium compensation and, 
hence, an equilibrium of the game. Firstly, we look for the level of compensation the 
firms have to pay to make a manager indifferent whether to stay or to leave. This can 
be done by solving expression (3.9). In this way, at any stage of the game a firm knows 
that, if selected manager’s compensation v{n-{- k) > tt^  (n +  A: +  1), the manager will 
stay, while, otherwise, she or he will leave. Secondly, it has to be found the number of 
firms k that enter at the equilibrium, so to fully characterize the final compensation 
V* (n +  k) and thus y* {v* [n k)) for every firm active in the market. By using a 
standard backward induction procedure, we notice that under the specification of the 
model, two different cases arise. They are both illustrated below.
3 .3 .1  In fin ite  num ber o f  stages
This describes the case in which there exists a virtual unlimited availability of managers 
ready to be hired by the firms of the industry and, as a consequence, the corresponding 
managers’ reservation wage is equal to zero. Moreover, denoting as t the number of 
new entrants that makes every firm’s profit (approximately) equal to zero, under the 
model specification, TTj {n 4- 1)equal to zero happens for t that tends to infinity, given 
that t must solve:
(a -  2yfv {n +  t ) j  ( a  -  2 V Ô )
® Moreover, as long as there are managers available to work, companies are completely indifferent 
whether to hire an unemployed manager or just recruit one that is currently working for another firm.
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provided that, when 7Vi[n-\-t) = 0, also v{n  + t) = 7Ti(n + t- \- l)  = 0. Thus, 
when {t — 1) firms have already entered the market, every manager will be indifferent 
whether to stay in the firm as employee, earning the corresponding wage v{n  + t — 1) =  
7Ti (tt- + 1) =  0 or just leave. Firms at the previous stage, knowing this, need to de­
cide whether to pay v* — 2) = TTi {v* { n 1  — 1)) to their managers (where v*
indicates, at every stage, the wage that respects (3.9)) or pay less, letting at least one 
manager leave to get a profit of ttî [v* {n + 1 — 1)). Thus, since at the last stage a 
manager will necessarily be paid v* {n-\-t — 1) = 7Ti{n-\-t) = 0 , one stage before firms 
will find convenient to pay v* {n + t — 2) only if:
7T* (v* ( n - h t - 2 ) )  > 7T* (v* (n -h t -  1)) (3.11)
The lemma presented below proves that, if every firm’s profit is weakly positive and
the next stage firm’s optimal strategy is which to fix a compensation that respect (3.9), 
it will be always convenient for a firm at the previous stage to do the same, paying 
every manager just enough to keep her or him within the firm.
L em m a 4 Under the model specification, if p {Y* {n +  k)) > ACi {y* {n +  k ) ) , for any 
possible k = 1 , 2 , . . . ,  oo, the following inequality holds for every firm i = 1, ...,n  + k:
7T* (v* (n -f k)) > 7T* (v* (n-j- k -h 1)) (3.12)
Proof. (See Appendix).
Since lemma 1 holds at any stage of the game, every firm’s optimal strategy will 
be which of paying the minimal remuneration sufficient to induce its managers to stay 
within the firm, i.e., a wage that respects (3.9). By backward induction, at the first 
stage of the game, when the n initiators decide whether to let their managers stay
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(paying them accordingly) or leave (thus increasing the existing number of firms), they 
will certainly set v = v* (n) and the equilibrium number of entrants will be A; =  0. The 
equilibrium remuneration v* (n) is thus obtainable by solving the following equation:
a — 2y^V* (?T- +  1)1  
V' (n) =  (»  +  ! )  =  ^ -------( ; r+ 2 p --------
Expression (3.13) is a non linear difference equation that can be solved by iteration 
on the potential number of entrants k. A straightforward substitution process yields:
 ^  ^ ( a ( n + 3 ) ( n + 4 ) ” (n + fc ) -2 o (n + 4 )" (n + A :)+ 4 a (n + 5 )” (n + A :)-8 a " + (-l)* ''''^ 2 ^ + ^  y^v*( n + k —lŸj
\  /  (n + 2 )^ (n + 3 )2  ••(n+A:)2
(3.14)
Now, from (3.10) we know that, for A: =   ^ ^  oo, v* {n + t — 1) = tt* (n + t) = 0. 
Hence, putting v* ( n 1  — I) = 0 into expression (3.14) and rearranging, we get:
E k - l H N l  f l  (T^ +  3 + ; )  +  ( - l ) ' - ' ( 2 '-^G)
i=0 j = t —3
V* (n) =  lim —------------------------ — --------------------------------------- —  (3.15)
(n 4- 2 T %)
4=0
Interesting properties of expression (3.15) are that it is unique for every set of 
parameters values and that takes finite values, even for a finite and very low number of 







T ab. 3.1 - V alues o f v * ( n ) ,  for t  =  0 . . . .1 5  ( a = 1 0 0 0 ,  n = 2 0 )
Moreover, the value of u* (n) is monotonically decreasing in the number n  of initia­
tors assumed to exists at the beginning of the game.
Now, by embedding expression (3.15) into (3.7), it ensues that, according to defini­
tion 1, the unique equilibrium of the game is (y^ (v* (n) ,n) ,y^ {v* (n ) , n) , {v* (n) ,n)).
3 .3 .2  F in i t e  n u m b e r  o f  s ta g e s
This is the case in which a market for managers exists in the economy and no manager 
is available to be hired for less than the market clearing wage, denoted as v. When 
this is the case, the reasoning above just needs a few changes. Since an equilibrium 
compensation must be sufficiently high to keep a manager within the firm (by condition 
3.3 of equilibrium), it needs to be:
v*(n + k) = max {v, (v*(n -j- k + 1))} (3.16)
and then.
v*(n + k) > V (3.17)
By expression (3.8) and (3.17) it follows that:
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7Ti (ïJ,n + /c) > 7Ti (î;*(71 +  A;),n +  A:) (3.18)
It is clear from (3.18) that there exists a finite t > k, îoi which ttî (v, n + 1) = v ,  with
a negligible approximation, due to the integer problem. Thus, v*{n-\-t — 1) = v i o i t
that solves:
n ,(v ,n  + k) = ^ l -^ ^ ^ = v  (3.19)
whose only positive solution is:
t =  +  (3.20)
Hence, at stage — 2) every firm will pay a manager a compensation equal to
v*{n-\-t — 2) only if:
7Ti {v*{n + t — 2)) > 7Vi {v*{n +  A — 1)) (3.21)
That lemma that follows proves that the above inequality always holds, at any stage 
of the game.
Lem m a 5 Under the model specification and for v* > v, at any stage of the game 
(k = 1 , 2 ,..., t), and for every firm (i = 1 ,..., n  +  /c), the following inequality holds:
7T* {v* [n +  k)) > 7T* (u* (n +  /c +  1)) (3 .2 2 )
Proof. (See Appendix).
Once again, expression (3.22) ensures that the n  initiators will decide in equilibrium 
to pay V =  V* (ji) and the equilibrium number of entrants will be A: =  0. Hence, the equi­
librium managers’ remuneration v* (n) is obtainable by iteration, through the choice
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E  (—f)' (2'u) n  (n +  3 +  j)  +  (—l y   ^2^   ^ (a — 2y/v)
J j = t - 3  J




Also in this case v* (n) is unique for every set of parameters and takes a finite value 
even for a very low t.
In figure below, v* (n) is plotted against different number of business initiators and 
compared to a given market clearing wage v. Managers’ compensation is decreasing 
with the number of firms assumed to exist in the market. Notice also that, since for 
a range of n equilibrium managers’ compensation is higher than the market clearing 
level, there will always be, within this range, managers available to be hired by the 
firms. This endogenous availability of managers allows for their substitution when they 





Fig 3 .2 -V a lu e s  of v * ( n )  a n d  w = v  for a = 3 5 0  a n d  n = l , . . 2 0 .  
In t h i s  e x a m p l e  v * ( n )  is e q u a l  to  i7= 10  for n = 8 .
The analysis that follows is conducted under the case, definitively more realistic, of 
a finite number of stages. This gives rise to a few results presented below. The first
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one is concerned with every firm’s equilibrium choice of managers, and it is expressed 
in the next proposition.
Proposition  6 Under the model assumptions, when the number of initiators is no 
greater than n, the equilibrium number of managers m* selected by every firm is less 
than it would be under standard neoclassical assumptions in the market for managers.
Proof. Since from (3.4) an efficient choice of managers implies m* = and, from 
(3.7) Cournot equilibrium output y* is monotonically decreasing in u, it ensues that 
m* {v* [n)) < m* (v) whenever v* (n) > ü,where v indicates the neoclassical market 
clearing wage. Since v* (n) = tTj (u* (n +  1)), and, by lemma 2, the second member 
is monotonically decreasing in n, there will certainly be a value of n =n  for which 
u* (n) =  V. Thus, for n  <n, m* {v* (n)) < m* (v) and the result follows. ■
It can be noticed that equilibrium quantity y* (v* (n ) , n) is, for every firm, de­
pendent on equilibrium managers’ compensation. Thus, since v* (n) is higher than v 
for n <n, it turns out that, when n < n, y* {v* (n) , n) < y* (v, n ) . This means that 
each firm is, within a given range of n, more collusive in terms of output than under 
usual market clearing conditions. There also exists an initial number of firms for which 
yl (v* (n) , n) exactly coincides with the perfectly collusive output choice under market 
clearing wage, i.e., that obtained when all firms cooperatively maximize their joint 
profit. These results are described in the next proposition.
P roposition  7 The output selected by every firm under Cournot equilibrium and man­
agers’ threat to leave is more collusive than under Cournot equilibrium and managers’ 
competitive market for n <n, that is, yl (y* ( n ) , n) < yl (ü, n) for n <n. Moreover, 
there exists a level of n = n* for which, yl [v* (n*) ,n*) = yj* {v ,n*), where yl* is the 
output resulting by cooperative agreement among firms.
Proof. By proposition 1, for n <n, v* (n) is greater than v. Since firm’s equilibrium 
output is monotonically decreasing in u, it follows that, for n <n, yl (u* (n) ,n) <
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ni (v,n). Moreover, straightforward manipulation of expression (3.23) show that it is 
equal to:
(n  ^+  23n‘‘ + 205n  ^+ 881n  ^+  1818n +  1424)  ^ ,
" (n +  2 f  (n +  3 f  {« + 4 f  (n +  5)'(n + 6 f  (n + 7 f   ^ ^
Substituting expression (3.24) for v* (n) into yields:
y- (t)* ( n ) , n) =  - — (3. 25) 
while, the collusive quantity under market clearing managers’ compensation v is:
y "  (^, n) = (3.26)
Thus, expression (3.25) is equal to (3.26) , for n =  n*, where n* is the only positive 
solution of an equation that, for ease of brevity, is not presented here. It can be noticed 
that the higher the managers’ market clearing wage and the lower will be the number 
of firms for which y^ * (u* ( n ) , n) = yl* {v, n ) . ■
A particular example of the result above is presented in figure 3.3. Given Ü, for 
n — 220, the collusive equilibrium quantity yl* [v, n) coincides with y* {y* (n) , n ) . In 
the example, for n <n, y** (y* ( n ) , n) turns out to be even more collusive than yl* (v, n ) . 
Moreover, since every firm’s quantity y'^ * [v* (n) , n) is also a Nash equilibrium quantity,
it will be stable against each firm’s temptation to deviate from the equilibrium choice 
of output, differently to what normally happens under collusive agreement. It can be 
noticed that such a particular example of non-cooperative collusive solution can take 
place either through mergers among firms (when the number of initiators is greater
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than n*) or through controlled departure of managers induced by a firm (when n  is 
lower than n*). The latter can specially be the case when the initiators maintain a share 
of the new companies’ control, a relatively widespread practise in high-tech industries/




F ig . 3 .3  - E quilib r iu m  q u an tity  b o th  for th e  m an ageria l firm  
yn{n)  and for th e p er fectly  co llu s iv e  firm (y c (n ))  (a = 1 0 0 0 , ï ï= 1 0 ,n = 0 , . .6 0 0 ) .
Anyway, the basic result of the model is that, whether the behaviour of existing 
firms in a market is less or more collusive than in usual Cournot models depends upon 
the number of business initiators that dispose of the basic know-how to set up a firm.
3.4 T he effect o f a fixed cost
The analysis of previous section was conducted under the extreme assumption that 
both business initiators and potential entrants do not bear any fixed cost to set up 
a firm. This section is devoted to explore which consequences arise when a positive 
fixed cost is needed to set up a business. In the model a fixed cost affects both the 
outside options of potential competitors as well as the profit of business initiators. 
It must be noticed that, including a fixed cost - under absence of whatsoever firm’s 
credit constraint - does not change the qualitative nature of equilibrium. Lemma 2
^For a description of the so called Spin-off practises in high-tech industries, see, among the others, 
Gordon (1992), and Seward and Walsh (1996), .
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still holds (although now the number t of stages of the game changes) and expression 
(3.13) becomes:
a -  2y/v* {n +  1 )^
(m) == (n 4- 1 ) =  -- (3.27)




v { n ) =
(-l)^(2^a+2»+^v/F(n+2+i)) Ç Jiri+3+j)
n (M+2+z)^  
1 = 0
+ ( - l ) ‘“ 2[2‘ - 2 ( a - 2 V u - 2 \ / F )
- -  f  ((hS!8 )
Once again, expression (3.28) is monotonically decreasing in the number of initiators 
n. However, the effect of the fixed cost is not unidirectional. For relatively low levels 
of F, every leaving manager’s outside option increases and the initiators behaviour 
will be in equilibrium even more collusive than before. Conversely, for high levels of 
F, manager’s outside option tends to decrease and so does the equilibrium degree of 
collusion put in place by initiators. The next proposition explains this result.
P ro p o s itio n  8  I f  the fixed cost needed to set up a firm is lower than F, every firm ’s 
equilibrium output will he more collusive than under entry threat and total absence of 
fixed cost. For F  > F  , the opposite result holds.
P ro o f. Since expression v* (n) converges to a finite value for a very low t, it can 
be twice derived with respect to F. Second derivative turns out to be negative, and 
function v* (n, F) concave with respect to F . It thus straightforward to find a finite 
value F  for which v* {n,F_) = v* ( n ,0 ) . It follows that, for F  E [0,F] ,v* (n, F ) > 
V* (n, 0) ; conversely, for F  6  (F , F] , v* (n, F ) < v* (n, 0), where F  indicates the level 
for which v* (n, F ) =  0. ■
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3.5 Som e generalizations o f th e  m odel
This section is devoted to give some generality to the results obtained above as well 
as to discuss which basic assumptions are strictly required to achieve the main model 
findings.
3 .5 .1  A ssu m p tio n s
We list below a number of assumptions required to obtain the collusive result in a 
Cournot model. These assumptions are that:
A .5.1 the payoff of each firm is a function of its own strategy and of the sum of 
strategies of all existing firms (usually defined as aggregation axiom] see, for instance, 
Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik (1980));
A .5.2 strategy sets Yi are, for every firm, compact and convex;
A .5.3 every firm’s payoff function, tTî : x  %+ —^ is twice continuously
differentiable;
A .5 .4  +  ^  < 0;
A .5 .5  ^  ^  < 0,
(A.5.4 and A.5.5 are standard assumptions for second order conditions to hold, see, 
for instance, Friedman (1977));
A.5 .6  The output of every firm is strictly decreasing in manager’s compensation u;
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3 .5 .2  B a sic  re su lts  and d iscu ssion
Under assumptions A.5.1-A.5.6, it can be proved that:
i) A Cournot-Nash equilibrium (?/î,2/2 j •••>2/n) always exists and is unique (see, for 
instance, Corchon (1996), p. 15);
ii) Condition tt* (n) >  tt* (n +  fc) for {k = 1 , 2 , t) always hold under firm’s posi­
tive profitability (see lemma 3, in appendix).
From i) and ii), the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition  9 Under Cournot oligopoly and managers ’ threat to leave, when assump­
tions A.5.1-A.5.6 hold, there always exists a number of initiators below which equilib­
rium managers^ compensation is higher than market clearing neoclassical wage. More­
over, within this range of n, equilibrium output is more collusive than in a standard 
Cournot model.
Proof. Result ii) implies that, for {k = 0,1,..., i), v* (n) is monotonically decreasing in 
n. Hence, it is always possible to find a n =n such that v* (n) = v and then for n  <n, 
V* (n) > V. Furthermore, from A.5.5 it ensues that, for n < n, y* {v* (n)) < y* ( v ) . ■
It can be interesting to spend a few words in discussing the meaning of A.5.5. 
Coupled with A.5.4, it ensures that every firm’s payoff is concave, from which, second 
orders conditions for a maximum are satisfied. This in turn requires either a ” not too 
convex” demand function or a ” not too concave” cost function with respect to output. 
By assuming (without loss of generality) a linear technology, it is easy to see that:
(n)  ^ dv* (n)
Note in general that the model assumptions always ensure that both ^  < 0
and thus, < 0 and that  ^ < 0 and then  ^ < 0. Hence, every firm’s
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cost function will be concave. Given a regular demand function, what is thus required 
for the collusive effect to take place is ”a not too concave” cost function. Condition 
(3.29) shows that for every firm the choice of yi yields, beside the usual negative effect 
on the demand function, an indirect effect on managers’ compensation. This effect has 
two components: the first is which to reduce the pay of every manager through the fall 
of her or his outside option, i.e., the threat to set up a new firm. The second is which to 
reduce the other subsequent potential k leaving managers’ outside option and, hence, 
increasing which of the first leaving manager. By taking the second derivative of v* (n) 
with respect to yi and applying the model specification used in section 3.3, it turns out 
that:
(3.30)
y *  j  =  l  j = l
Condition (3.30) may certainly hold when expression (3.29) is not ’’too negative” . 
This implies to impose that the chain effect on every A;-th entrants has sufficient 
strength to almost offset the direct negative effect of an output increase on the first 
leaving manager’s outside option. However, the same result would ensue by assuming 
that every manager’s learning process requires a certain period of time to be completed. 
In this case, it would always exist a discount factor 6 E (0,1) sufficiently low for firms’ 
payoff to fall with the number of entrants k and hence, for the collusive effect to take 
place.
3.6 C oncluding rem arks
We have described, through an extremely simple model, that companies owners’ need to 
fix a level of compensation high enough to keep managers within the firm can give rise to 
a collusive choice of output stable against individual firm’s deviations. The result holds 
when the depressive effect of leaving managers on firms’ profit prevails on the positive 
effect due to a reduction of their compensation, and the existing number of firms is not
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very high. Furthermore, the model generates the empirically appealing property (see, 
for instance, Watson et al. (1994)) that managers’ compensation is decreasing with the 
number of firms existing in the market and, consequently, with their size. The nature 
of every company’s knowledge may also play a role as long as firms’ (organizational 
or technological) procedures difficult to duplicate decrease managers’ outside option 
hence increasing the number of hired managers in the industry. On the other hand, 
easily replicable companies’ procedures would be coupled with a reduced number of 
recruited managers (due to the very high managers’ outside option) and companies’ 
output restrictions. In this respect, given the initial number of firms operating in 
an industry, complex and heterogeneous company’s procedures could be beneficial in 
terms of level of output and competition generated in the market.
3 .7  A p p en d ix
P roof o f Lem m a 1. As long as, p {Y* {n + k)) > ACi {y* (n +  A:)) , the following
inequality holds for every i = 1, ...,n  k
TV* {v* { n k ) , n-t- k) > tt* (u* (n +  A: +  1) , n +  /c +  1) (3.31)
Proof. The meaning of expression (3.31) is that, under positive profitability of ex­
isting firms, every company finds convenient to pay each manager the equilibrium 
wage V* [n 4- k) rather than let her or him go, starting a new negotiation with another 
manager. Let us prove the lemma by contradiction.
Suppose inequality (3.31) does not hold, tha t is:
p {Y* {n +  k)) -  2y/v* (n +  k) yl (n -f- A:) <
< p {Y* (n -I- A: 4-1)) — 2-y/u* (n +  A: +  1) y* { n k  + 1)
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This expression can be solved by iteration and, for each firm under the potential 
market entry of t firms, the following result ensues;
, \  ^ +  \p { V ( n  + t) )y ;{ n  + t ) - v ‘ {n + t)4:yr{n + t)Ÿ
V (n + k ) > --------- -------------------------------------- r m — riTT;-----------------------
4 A{y;{n + t))‘
where t indicates the number of firms that can enter before every firm’s profit is equal
to zero and the game ends. Since in this case there are no entry costs, room potentially 
exists for an infinite number of entrants. Hence, taking the limit of expression above 
for t that tends to infinite, we get:
v ’ (n + k ) >  {n + k ) f  _  [p { ¥ ' (n + 1)) yf  (ra +  i) -  v* (n +  t) 4y* {n +  t)]^
4 4{y*(n-\-k)Ÿ
that can be rewritten as:
2^/v* {n +  k) • y* (n +  /c) > p {Y* {n +  k)) • y* {n + k) — lim TTj {v* {n +  t))£—> oo
and then.
• y* {n-\-k) > p (T* (n +  k)) - y* {n-\-k) — 0
from which:
2y/v* {n +  k) = AC {y* {n k)) > p {¥* (n)) 
that contradicts the assumption of every firm’s weak positive profitability. This con­
cludes the proof. ■
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P ro o f  o f L em m a 2. Under the existence of a given market clearing wage for 
managers equal to v, the following inequality holds for every i = + k :
7T* {v* {n k) ,n  + k) > TT* {v* {n k 1) ,n  + k 1) (3.32)
P ro o f.
Suppose inequality (3.32) does not hold, that is:
p (y* {n +  k)) -  2 ^v*  {n +  k) yl (n +  /c) <
< p iy*  ( n  +  A: +  1 ) )  — 2^ 0* ( n  +  /c +  1 )  y l  { n  +  k - \- l)
This expression can be solved by iteration and, for every firm under the potential 
market entry of t firms, the following result ensues:
V* { n  +  k )  >  (^+fe))------ lim TTi { v *  ( n  +  t ) )  =  (n+fc))------
s—*t
from which:
TTi {v* {n + k)) = V* {n + k — 1) < v  
that contradicts the fact that every manager’s compensation must necessarily be greater 
than market clearing wage. This concludes the proof. ■





d p  ( Y )  d ^ C i i v i )
a v  &yt
the following inequality holds:
<  0 (A.5.5)
7T* {v* (n ) , n) > 7T* {v* {n 1) ,n  1) (3.33)
Proof. (Standard) Assumptions (A.5.4) and (A.5.5) always imply that Y* (n) < 
Y* and y* (n) > yl (n +  1). Provided this, and using first order conditions, it
follows that:
d7T*(n) _  dyl  ^ dp* dY* dC dyl _  
dn dn^~^ dY* dn dyl dn
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Chapter 4 
Stable Producer Co-operatives in 
C om petitive Market
4.1 In troduction
Modern capitalist economies as well as economies in transition are often characterized 
by a puzzling mixture of large private and public corporations, small-size companies, 
producer co-operatives and self-employment type of ventures, sometimes coexisting 
in the same industries. There are, however, sectors in which certain types of firms 
seem to be particularly at ease. In particular, different forms of producer co-operatives 
(henceforth PCs) and partnerships can usually be found - although not exclusively - in 
construction, printing, glass-making, woodworking and service industries (for instance 
in Italy, Prance and Sweden), in clothing and footwear (in U.K.) and in plywood, refor­
estation and taxi cab industries (in U.S.). In other cases, these forms of organization 
appear concentrated in relatively restricted areas, with a diversified range of activities 
(as, for instance, in Mondragon, Spain).^However, in all these cases some common fea­
tures of the industries in which PCs are clustered exist and seem to be, among the 
others, low barriers to entry, small size of firm, a rather specific and trained workforce 
and a relatively high degree of competition. Do these features have something to do 
with the arguments usually adopted to explain the PCs’ (in)stability?
^See Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993) for a general overview on Producer Co-operatives.
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There is an extensive body of literature addressing the reason behind the birth of 
labour-managed types of organizations.^ In particular, one element of this of litera­
ture concerns the feasibility and stability of democratic forms of enterprise in capitalist 
markets.^ The bulk of the instability argument is that, in profitable industries, PCs’ 
members can find convenient to dismiss part of the firm’s membership to recruit less 
expensive fixed-wage workers. However, since the industries in which PCs usually 
operate appear to be (according to the above mentioned features) vulnerable to com­
petition from new entrants into the market, it seems natural to look at what happens 
if, when dismissed, every PC’s member has the possibility to set up a new firm. Fur­
thermore, as said above, PCs generally occur in an environment in which companies’ 
setup costs are low and employees often possess highly specific skills. These features 
allow the workers recruited both by PCs and capitalist firms (henceforth CF) alike to 
possess a concrete outside option during the wage bargaining process. Therefore, the 
effect of existing workers’ outside options should be considered in the determination of 
every industry equilibrium wage. In which case, dropping the usual exogenous, wage 
assumption could help better explain the mechanism of PC ’s instability. Since P C ’s 
members are usually assumed to compare their remuneration with a given equilibrium 
wage, ultimately the stability of a PC’s membership should be tested against a wage 
endogenously determined.
The aim of this chapter is to include some of the described features in a standard 
labour-managed firms setup. Two main insights are provided. Firstly, that in an envi­
ronment in which dismissed members can set up new firms, the P C ’s instability does 
not hold if not under specific conditions, mainly concerning the market demand elas­
ticity. Secondly, that there are particular situations in which workers have an incentive 
to set up PCs while, under other circumstances, such incentives do not exist. Finally, 
if a co-operative is profitably formed in such environment, it can be shown to be stable 
within a range of market parameters.
This chapter uses a simple short-run perfectly competitive model with n  firms to
^For accurate surveys see, for instance, Ireland and Law (1984), Bonin and Putterman (.), Bonin, 
Jones and Putterman (1993) and Dow and Putterman (1995).
^See, among the others, Webb and Webb (1920), Tugan-Baranovskii (1921), Jones (1975,1979), 
Ben-ner (1984,1988), Myizaki (1988), Estrin and Jones (1992).
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present its main results. Extensions to imperfectly competitive market and heteroge­
neous workers setups are possible but, for ease of simplicity, are not presented here. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 extends the traditional PC ’s instabil­
ity result and introduces the basic idea of the paper. Section 4.3 describes a simple 
model of endogenous wage determination from which the main results of the paper are 
obtained. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 T h e P C ’s in stab ility  argum ent
The traditional Ward’s (1958) and Vanek’s (1970) per capita value-added objective 
function assumed for the producer co-operatives is the feature usually thought to make 
these forms of enterprise unstable under positive profitability. Since a successful PC 
can profitably acquire new workers in the spot labour market at a given market wage to 
replace its members, this feature is supposed to yield an iterative process of substitution 
leading eventually a PC to be owned and managed by just one member and become a 
capitalist firm.'^
Ben-ner (1984), for instance, establishes this result in a standard perfect competi­
tion and partial equilibrium framework either with fixed or with variable use of capital, 
also admitting the possibility of an individual members’ productivity higher than that 
of workers hired in the spot labour market.^
In a model with uncertainty Miyazaki (1984) generalizes the PC ’s instability re­
sult, showing that, whenever a CF’s expected profit is positive, the twin PC tends to
some countries PCs are obliged by law to respect a given member-employee ratio according 
to the "open door” principle. However, this principle is usually not respected by employee-owned 
firms without a co-operative status. Moreover, in several countries legislative reforms have recently 
weakened the above mentioned constraint. For a survey of the main legislative changes occured in 
Europe and a theoretical analysis of their consequences, see, for instance, Marini and Zevi (1995, 
1996) and Monzon C. & al. (1996).
^In Ben-ner’ s framework the only possible exception to this result occurs when there is a " network 
externality” among PC’s members. This makes unprofitable to break the network of members to 
exchange inexpensive wage-labourers with expensive PC’s members. Obviously, such an exception 
specifically depends upon the form assumed by the network externality.
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degenerate into a CF. As a consequence, the only raison d ’etre of a PC can be an 
environment in which CFs are expected to become insolvent.^
The P C ’s instability result can easily be described as follows. Suppose a perfectly 
competitive PC that has optimally recruited a certain number of members m  and of 
fixed-wage workers £ to maximize its per member value added:
(4.1)
 ^  ^ m*  ^ ^
where p indicates the market price for a certain commodity, yi represents the com­
modity itself produced by every z-th firm (z =  l ,. .. ,n )  with the use of members and 
fixed-wage workers, zn is a given market wage and F  a fixed cost. Now, by dismissing 
one member and hiring one fixed-wage worker (assumed equally productive) to replace 
him, each remaining member gets the following:
V {m -  -  l , r  + = +  (4.2)
[m* -  1)
By straight forward manipulations of (4.2) the following result ensues:
It is obvious from expression (4.3) that the member-reducing strategy is convenient 
as long as V  {m* ,£*) — w > 0, that is, the value added of each member is higher than the 
current market wage w. Furthermore, since V  =  zn 4- where tt represents
every CF’s profit, it turns out that as long as every CF is profitable, V  > w and every 
PC is unstable against the above mentioned process of members’ substitution.
®This is contained in Miyazaki (1984), proposition 1, p.917. The author also extends his analysis 
to include the possibility of both an incomplete insurance and an imperfect capital market.
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However, usually this argument does not take into account the behaviour of a mem­
ber after his dismissal. In fact, in an environment in which the people associated with 
a PC have developed an entrepreneurial skill and barriers to entry are relatively low, a 
dismissed member may have the opportunity to set up a new firm either as entrepre­
neur, self-employed or member of a newly created PC, rather than be unemployed. In 
which case, every PC’s payoff should include such a new entrant effect, even when just 
one member has been dismissed.
Two comparative statics exercises can be performed as a consequence of this obser­
vation. In the first it can be assumed that, although the dismissed member sets up a 
new firm in the same industry, the subsequent market price change does not affect the 
levels of m* and optimally decided by the PC before the new firm’s entry. Hence, 
the substitution of one member with one fixed-wage worker affects every remaining 
member’ s payoff as follows:
V K - 1 . r  + 1 )  =  +  (4.4)
 ^  ^ {m* -  I)  ^ '
where p {Y* (n 4-1)) is the market clearing price when a new firm has entered the 
market. Expression (4.4) can easily be rewritten as:
V { m ' - l , r  +  l )  =  V  (m*, r )  +  ^  I  I" ) (4 .5)
[m i j
where AR* (n) /A n  represents the change in the firm’s equilibrium revenue as due 
to the new firm’s entry in the industry.^
In this case, even under positive profitability of a twin CF, the usual PC ’s instability 
does not necessarily arise. In general, in a market with n identical (PC) firms, a change
market price reduction has traditionally the effect on existing PCs to decrease and increase 
m*. However, expression (2.5) implies an out-of equilibrium reduction of 1 unit for m* and a rise of 
1 unit for ^*,with obviuosly no effect on .
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in the firm’s equilibrium revenue R* {n) = p {Y* (n)) as due to the entry of new firms 
can be expressed as;
where y indicates the industry demand elasticity. Expression (4.6) shows that if 
the industry demand elasticity is (in absolute value) less than 1 , new firms’ entry, by 
decreasing the price, reduce as well the revenue of every PC in the market. Furthermore, 
the lower the number of firms in the market, the stronger will be the negative entry 
effect of a dismissed member on every PC ’s revenue and consequently more unlikely 
will be the phenomenon of PC members’ substitution. More precisely, for a member’s 
dismissal to be surely profitable, it must be that, for y < 1:
V  { m * A R *  (n ) /A n  — w > 0 (4.7)
It is easy to see that, for AR* (n) /A n  < 0, the condition above may fail to hold 
also for V  > w.
A second comparative statics exercise can be performed by taking into account the 
whole change caused by the replacement of one member with one fixed worker. After 
this happens, every PC ’s payoff can be expressed as:
V( m-  (» + 1) , r  (n + 1)) =  ? ( "  + (” +  1) -
(m *{n-\-l))
(4.8)
where respectively m* (n +  1) and £* {n + 1) represent the new equilibrium number 
of members and workers after the new firm’s entry. The following example shows that
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expression (4.8) can be lower than the original payoff V  even for 77 > 1 .
E xam ple . Let P  (Q) = a — Y  he the inverse market demand function. Let every 
LM F’s production function be equal to yi = min , where a and j3 are para­
meters belonging to the interval (0,1). It ensues that:
I * / \ n* t \\ (VcF -  6Fn) (2a^ -  3Fn) -  3aFn +  2a^ -  27wF‘^P 
^  K  (n) , r  in)) =  ^ ^ -----------------------------
The expression above is monotonically decreasing in n, and the equilibrium demand
elasticity g is greater than 1. Therefore, in this case, also for  77 > 1, existing LMFs do 
not have any incentive to substitute members with fixed-wage workers.
The next proposition generalizes the instability result under the entry threat of 
every dismissed member.
Proposition  10 Under a given market wage for workers, sufficient conditions for 
every PC to conveniently dismiss a member and hire a fixed wage-eamer are, for g < 1 
that:
[E* (n +  1) — wP  (72 +  1) — F] m* (n) > [R* {n) — w t  {n) — F] m* [n +  1) 
and, for 77 > 1 that:
R {n -\- l)  m* {n) > R  (n) m* (n +  1)
Proof. This simply follows by straightforward manipulations of expressions (4.1) and
(4.8). ■
The proposition shows that, under the threat of a new firm’s entry, the instability 
of a PC is not granted anymore. The argument does not apply to the case of members’ 
retirement, in which usually there is not formation of new firms. Similarly, high barriers
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to entry in the market and high individual members’ risk aversion, by reducing the 
chance of the creation of new companies, also weaken the relevance of the argument. 
Perhaps thus, it is not so casual that usually PCs populate industries characterized by 
significantly high skilled workforce (with an easily transferable human capital) and low 
entry barriers.
4.3  E ndogenous w age and firm stab ility
It has been stressed that ’’the different choices of labour, and therefore output in the 
short run (between a PC and a CF), are attributable to the different decision-making 
problems used to represent the two organizational forms, i.e., the wage is exogenous, to 
the CF but endogenous and higher in the PC.” (Bonin, Jones and Putterm an (1993), 
p. 1298). The analysis presented in this section seeks to remove the above asymmetric 
treatment adopted for CF workers and PC members’ compensation, so as to make both 
endogenous. If a PC has to be judged for its stability, why should not the same criteria 
apply to a CF? In a highly competitive industry there might be reasons why very low 
wages are not sustainable by the existing CFs. Were the current wage lower than every 
worker’s outside option, employees would start leaving their workplace and set up new 
firms either as entrepreneurs, self-employed or members of new PCs. By taking this 
point of view, an endogenous equilibrium wage for a given industry (a wage for which 
a CF is stable) can be described. As a result, it is under this equilibrium wage that 
PC ’s birth and stability has to be tested against alternative forms of organization.
This section models a standard n-profit maximizing capitalistic firms’ market in 
which every identical firm produces a homogeneous good y with the use of labour i  
and a given setup cost F }  The basic feature of the model that drives its particular
®It may well be possible to start with a mixed market in which a certain number of CFs and PCs 
coexist togheter. However, a logical objection would be: why have PCs been created if they are not 
stable? Since the main paper concern is precisely the PCs’ stability, it seems more reasonable to 
start with a given number of CFs in the market in order to check if room potentially exists for the 
subsequent formation and survival of PCs.
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results is given by the nature of workers’ entrepreneurial skill and by the firm-worker 
relationship. W hat is assumed is basically that, once recruited as employees by a firm, 
workers acquire a specific skill (for instance a certain knowledge on how to organize 
the production) that potentially enables them to set up new production units through 
different organizational forms. The common knowledge of this possibility gives rise 
to a concrete outside option for every firm’s employee. This outside option is taken 
into account by every firm’s owner when fixing the wage. The employees’ exit and 
the consequent creation of new firms can in fact lower existing firms’ profitability. 
Under these circumstances, a PC can be set up by a group of workers only when the 
newly created PC ’s expected value added is at least equal to the equilibrium workers’ 
remuneration, endogenously determined within the industry. Moreover, for a new PC 
to be a stable form of organization, its payoff has to be stable against a process of 
further members’ dismissal and creation of new firms in the market.
4 .3 .1  T h e  equ ilibrium  w age in a  ca p ita listic  in d u stry
Let us assume n profitable capitalist firms existing in a given product market. After 
bearing a given fixed cost let every firm need a certain quantity of labour to produce just 
one commodity. Given this simple framework, a level of wage having certain features 
of stability can be introduced. The conditions required to characterize an equilibrium 
wage can be described as follows:
w{n)  > p  {Y* {n +  1)) y*cjr {n + 1) -  w { n 1) i*cF (n + 1) -  F  (4.9)
(4.10)
w{n)  >p { ¥ *  {n + l ) ) y s E  -  F  (4.11)
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p 0^* H )  V C F  H  -  ^  W  ^ C F  ( n ) -  F > w  (n) (4.12)
where respectively y^jp (n +  1) and (n +  1) represent the quantity of good and the
number of workers optimally selected by a newly set up capitalist firm, y*p^ j ( tt, +  1 ) and 
£*pc +  1) the quantity and the workers chosen by a new entrant producer co-operative 
and p{Y* [n 1)) is the correspondent market price when one more firm enters the 
market. As long as the wage respects the above conditions, none of the hired workers 
will find convenient to leave the firm to set up new firms as entrepreneurs (4.9), PC ’s 
members (4.10) or self-employed (4.11). Notice that the third condition concerns the 
self-employed option, in which one worker produces alone a given output T/gg. The 
assumption, in each of conditions above, is that when employees leave from a firm, the 
latter is assumed to recruit one or a group of unemployed to replace them. This implies 
that a pool of unemployed workers exist in equilibrium, even if, when not hired by a 
firm, their outside option is just equal to Moreover, condition (4.12) ensures that 
none of n entrepreneurs earn less than his hired workers, otherwise it would become 
convenient to let workers go and set up a new firm under a lower wage. Denoting the 
wage obtained by solving expressions (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) respectively as Wi Wn  and 
Wiii^ the next definition simply illustrates the fact that under the above framework the 
equilibrium wage needs to respect a few basic conditions.
D efin ition  4 For each number n of CFs initially existing in the market, the equilib­
rium wage paid by every firm must respect the following conditions:
{w i,w n ,w in }  > V (4.13)
®The existence of a group of unemployed workers can be made endogenous whenever w* (n) >  v, 
where v is the given reservation wage of the economy. Furthermore, every entrepreneur is assumed to 
behave à la Nash, in the sense that any other’ s strategy (for instance which of the other recruited 
workers) is taken as given during the negotiation with every employee.
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E x p lan a tio n . Given the existing number of firms, the equilibrium wage must 
respect the RHS of expression (4.13), otherwise every employee, given the behaviour 
of other employees, would prefer to leave the firm. The LHS of (4.13) is the solution 
of (4.12) and simply ensures that every CF’s entrepreneur will never prefers to set 
up a new firm. This corresponds to the condition, tt {w*  (n)) > w*  (n). When this 
expression holds, since by (9), w*  (n) > W / ,  it immediately follows that
TT* {w*  (n ) , n) > 7T* (w* (n +  1), n +  1),
where tt^  (w* (n +  1) ,n - i -1) is every firm’s profit after one more firm has entered the
market (also affecting the equilibrium wage). Thus, given n firms, this condition makes 
the equilibrium consistent: every CF will always try to keep its employees inside the 
firm through the payment of the equilibrium wage. Finally, for the workers to partic­
ipate in production, the equilibrium wage must never be lower than the reservation 
wage V payable in the economy.
4 .3 .2  B ir th  and sta b ility  o f  a P C
A direct consequence of the simple definition introduced above is that, as long as the 
equilibrium industry wage respects all the stability conditions, PCs can be formed only 
under particular circumstances. These are expressed in the next proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  11 Under the industry equilibrium wage w* (n) all existing active work­
ers are indifferent between being members of a new PC and being employees of an 
existing CF only if  the following condition holds:
w* (n) = w ji > max {wj, Wm}  (4.14)
When, conversely, w* (n) — Wj > w u  or w* (n) == w ju  > Wu, every worker will prefer 
to be employee, CF entrepreneur or self-employed rather than form a new PC.
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P roof. (Self-evident) In all subcases included in expression (4.14) workers are indiffer­
ent between being employed in a CF or being members of a newly created PC. Thus, 
their choice will mainly depend upon their personal preferences. When, conversely, 
w* (n) = Wj > Wjj, workers will be indifferent between being entrepreneurs in a new 
CF (using unemployed workers paid their current equilibrium wage w* (n +  1)) and 
being employees for an existing CF. However, since w* (n) > Wu  any worker or group 
of workers will have incentives to set up a PC. The same situation arises (with the 
self-employment option) when w* (n) = W m  > Wu.  Finally, since unemployed workers 
do not possess the specific knowledge required to set up a firm, their only possibility is 
to be inactive, obtaining the reservation wage v (represented, for instance, by a public 
subsidy). ■
The above proposition describes a market in which employees’ threat to leave their 
firm and become direct competitors affects their final equilibrium wage. This frame­
work can suitably describe only those industries in which existing firms require both 
highly trained workers and relatively low setup costs to produce a commodity. The 
next example constitutes a specific application of the results of proposition 11.
E xam ple  1 Suppose, as before, an inverse market demand function isoelastic and
n
equal to P  {Y  (n)) =  A Y ~ ‘^ , with r\ = 1, where Y  = Y^Vi, and pi is the quantity
i= \
produced by every identical CF in the market. Furthermore, let each CF’s production 
function be pi = y /l and let F  be the fixed cost required to start the production. By 
condition (3.6) included in definition 1, the equilibrium wage must respect the following 
conditions:
w iv > w* (n) =  M ax {wiWu,Wj j i }  > v 
where wIV = ^ .By straightforward calculations, the following expressions
ensue:
=  2+TI) -  ^
“  2 A F n - 1 - 1
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A - F { n  + \) + J A ^ - 2 A F ( n  + l) + F'  ^
“ V {2 + n) (4.17)
W fv  =   F.2n (4.18)
In figure below, these values are plotted against different number of CFs assumed 
to exist in the market. It can be noticed that, for n = 16, W/v > Wjj > Wju > Wi. 
Hence, given this initial number of firms, by definition 4 it follows that w* [n) = Wu 
and, by proposition 9, that existing employees have incentives to form PCs whenever, 







Fig- 4.1 - L evels of th e d ifferent w orkers’ o u tsid e  op tion s  
for n = 1 5 ,..1 7  (> \= 8 0 0 , v = \ ,  F = 1 7 .5 ) .
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Figure 4.1 shows that Wjj (the PC’s type of outside option) is the only outside 
option increasing with the number of CFs supposed to exist in the market. The reason 
is that PCs react to price reductions (due to the higher number of firms) with an 
increase in the number of members and hence with a rise in the output. In the above 
example, with unitary elasticity, this effect always rises every PC’s payoff.
We can now turn to the stability of every newly formed PC. In a framework like 
the one described above, when a PC is set up it can also be proved to be stable against 
the subsequent process of substitution of members with spot labour market workers 
in the sense of Ben-ner (1988) and Myizaki (1988). In fact, although at a first glance 
it may look profitable to exchange existing members with unemployed workers, once 
trained, the newly recruited workers have to be paid the current equilibrium wage. 
That a newly formed PC can be stable, however, needs to be proved. This is done in 
the next proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  12 When new PCs are set up by trained workers leaving an existing CF, 
they are always stable against the temptation to reduce their membership through the 
recruitment of available unemployed workers as long as the market elasticity p < 1. 
When, conversely, 77 > 1, P C ’s stability is guaranteed only under specific conditions.
P roof. Proposition 9 showed that new PCs can only be formed under condition 
(4.14). Thus, if an unemployed worker is hired by a newly created PC to substitute 
a member, this worker will become trained and will threaten to leave unless paid the 
new equilibrium wage. By the results of the model, this wage will be greater or equal 
to Wii (n +  1 ). Thus, to decide whether or not a PC is stable against the process of 
members’ dismissal it has to be checked that:
P  (y* (n +  2)) ypc{n  +  2) -  wjj (n +  1) -  F  ^  P {Y* {n +  1)) ypc{n  +  1) -  F  
m*(n +  2 ) “  m *(n-f-1)
(4.19)
When ?7 < 1 it follows that, in terms of revenues, R pc  (n +  2) < R pc  (n +  1). 
Moreover, in general, m*(n +  2) > Hence, for 77 < 1, expression (4.19) holds
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with strict inequality even for wji (n + 1) = 0, so that PC ’s stability is always ensured 
as a result. For 77 > l,in  order to undermine PC’s stability the rise in revenue due to 
every member substitution must prevail over a sum of negative effects. Specifically, 
straightforward manipulations show that PC’s stability is preserved as long as:
[Rpc (ji 2) — F  — Wjj (n +  1)] 771* (tt, +  1) ^  [Rpc "h 1) — F] +  2) (4.20)
Thus, under the existing equilibrium wage, if new recruited workers are not more
productive than existing members it turns out that only under specific conditions (that 
represented in expression (4.20)) PCs do not find profitable to substitute members with 
fixed-wage workers. ■
In example 2, since 77 =  1, it can be checked that,
P  (y *  (71 +  2)) +  2) =  P  ( y  (71 +  1)) +  1)
and, since, in general, p {Y* (n +  2)) < P  (Y* (n +  1)), it ensues that:
771*(71 +  2) =  (t/pc- (71 +  2)) =  ^p(yq^+2))) ^
77l*(71+l) =  (ypc(^ +  l)) =  (p(yqn+l)))
Hence, condition (4.20) is always respected with strict inequality.
In general, proposition 10 helps to see that, in a given industry, the presence of an 
endogenous equilibrium wage makes PCs more robust against the internal instability 
process.
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4 .3 .3  O ther form s o f  in stab ility : an  exam p le
The model presented above has described a situation in which, once workers become 
trained and ready to set up new companies, a certain equilibrium wage can endoge­
nously be obtained. However, when a change takes place in the existing market con­
ditions, it may well be possible that other forms of PCs’ instability enter the scene. 
The next example describes a situation in which an exogenous shock in the market 
demand gives rise to a switch in the equilibrium wage w* (n) from Wjj to W m . When 
this happens, the newly created PC ’s members can suddenly find convenient either to 
become employees for existing CFs (with the further advantage for CFs to get rid of 
some of existing PCs and hence reduce the market competition), or, alternatively, to 
become self-employed. This is just one example of instability usually not considered in 
the traditional models of labour-managed firms.
E x am p le  2 Adopting the same model specification introduced above, let A, the demand 
size parameter, be subjected to an exogenous shock. The figure below depicts the effects 
of an increase in A, from A  =  860 to A  = 920, for a given number of existing firms 
[n =  15) and for certain values of parameters {F = 17.5, v = 2.5).
The figure 4.2 shows that, as long as 860 < A <  865, the equilibrium wage w* (n) is 
equal to Wu and the entry of new PCs in the market has then been viable. However, a 
small change in A  (such to make A > 865) makes incumbent PCs potentially unstable. 
Under the new value of A, the equilibrium wage w* (n) becomes either equal to W m  
or Wj and hence PCs’ members find now attractive either to be hired as employee by 
existing CFs or to set up new units of production respectively as self-employees or 
entrepreneurs.
That represented is just one of the possible forms of instability that a PC can suffer 
during its life-cycle. Similar examples can certainly be found, showing that, even in a 





F ig .4.2 - Levesl of w orkers’ ou tsid e  o p tion s
for y4= 860 ..920 , ( n = 1 5 ,  v —2.b,  F '= 1 8 .5 ).
4.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has shown that the usual argument for Producer Co-operatives’ instabil­
ity may not hold if an active (rather than passive) behaviour is assumed on the part 
of every member after their dismissal. Whether this is a reasonable description of a 
member’s behaviour is probably dependant on the specific context in which a firm is 
assumed to sell its product. In markets characterized by low entry barriers and a highly 
skilled workforce, dismissed members are probably able to set up new production units 
rather than be inactive. If this is the case, the traditional conclusions on Producer 
Co-operatives’s instability have to be corrected and further analysis is needed to draw 
conclusive results on the general robustness of this form of enterprise. Moreover, since 
labour-managed forms of organization are often observed in markets characterized by a 
highly skilled workforce, low entry barriers and high potential competition (e.g., in fish­
eries, potteries or services industries), assuming an endogenously determined workers’ 
compensation does not seem too unrealistic for these markets. The model has shown 
that under such circumstances. Producer Co-operatives’ instability is even less likely to
arise. However, other sources of instability then become possible. Particular instances 
of instability can occur as a consequence of exogenous shocks that, by changing the cur­
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Chapter 5 
The Core of Economies w ith  
Stackelberg Leaders
5.1 In trodu ction
The traditional representation of cooperative games with transferable utility is based 
on a ’’characteristic” function, specifying for each coalition the amount of utility tha t its 
members can ensure themselves in the underlying normal form game. This formulation 
is meant to isolate coalitional decisions, abstracting from the strategic complexity of 
the cooperation process. However, unless the payoffs of the members of a coalition 
and of its complement are independent (orthogonal games) or opposite (constant sum 
games), the characteristic function fails to be well defined^. Indeed, this is the case of 
many meaningful strategic situations, in which the payoff of each player may generally 
depend on the strategies of all players in the game. In such cases, the characteristic 
function can still be well defined by introducing some assumptions on the strategies of 
players in the complementary coalitions (the “outside players”).
One way to deal with this problem, first proposed by von Neumann-Morgenstern 
(1944) and considered by Aumann (1967), is to assume that outside players coordinate
I^n Shubik (1982) terminology, the game is not a c-game.
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their strategies to minimize the aggregate payoff of the forming coalition. A temporal 
structure is implicitly introduced in the players’ choice of strategies. In the so called 
o-core, the forming coalition acts as a leader, and chooses its best strategies, given 
the minimizing behaviour of outside players; in the /3-core, conversely, it behaves as a 
follower, and maximizes its payoff given the coordinated strategies of outside players. 
Since in both cases deviations are very costly, a  and /3-core are usually very large. 
Moreover, still fulfilling a rationality requirement in constant sum games, a  and /3- 
assumptions do not seem justifiable in most economic settings^.
An alternative approach proposed by Aumann (1959) extends Nash Equilibrium ”- 
passive” expectations to the cooperative framework. The concept of strong equilibrium 
defined by the author assumes that deviating coalitions take as given the strategies of 
outside players. Being immune from the deviations of any coalition, thus including the 
grand coalition and every individual player, strong equilibria are both Nash equilibria 
and efficient strategies. However, since in games with positive externalities the effi­
cient strategies of excluded players make coalitional deviations “too” profitable, strong 
equilibria do not exist for many economic problems.
In the contest of some recent economic applications, a different approach has proved 
useful in ensuring a non-empty core without making use of extreme assumptions on the 
behaviour of outside players such as the a  and ^  conjectures. This approach, named 
7 -approach by Chander-Tulkens (1997), assumes that outside players neither jointly 
minimize the payoff of a deviating coalition (as in the a  and /3-core), nor keep their 
strategies fixed (as in the Strong Nash Equilibrium), but they rather maximize their 
own utility as singletons. Here, the behaviour of deviating players and which of outside 
players is implicitly assumed to develop in two stages. In the first stage, similarly to 
the r  game by Hart and Kurtz (1983),^ a coalition forms and the excluded players split
^Indeed, in costant sum games, the A-core coincides with the modified characteristic function 
proposed by Harsanyi (1959), assigning to each coalition the solution of the variable threats Nash 
bargaining problem with the respective complementary coalition.
^The r  game is indeed a strategic coalition formation game with fixed payoff division, in which the 
strategies consist of the choice of a coalition. Despite the different nature of the two games, there is 
an analogy concerning the coalition structure induced by a deviation from the grand coalition. In the 
r  game, any deviation from the the grand coalition’s strategy profile induces a coalition structure in 
which the deviating coalition stay together and the outside players split up.
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up as singletons; in the second stage, members of the deviating coalition and excluded 
players simultaneously choose their strategies in the underlying normal form game, 
given the specific coalition structure originated in the first stage. Consequently, the 
strategy profile induced by the deviation of a coalition S  C N  is the Nash equilibrium 
among S  and each individual player in N \S .
In this chapter we modify the 7 -assumption by removing this two stage structure 
and reintroducing the temporal sequence in the choice of players’ strategies in the un­
derlying normal form game, typical of the a  and /3-core. We assume that the formation 
of a coalition and the choice of a coordinated strategy by its members in the underlying 
game are two simultaneous events, that can be thought of as a unique action. When 
a set of players form a coalition, at the same time they choose a coordinated strategy, 
taking as given the (non-cooperative) reaction of the excluded players as singletons. In 
this respect, deviating coalitions possess a first mover advantage with respect to  the 
outside players. We thus associate with the deviation of every coalition S  the Stackel­
berg equilibrium in which S  acts as leader and players in N \ S  play (individually) as 
followers.
According to this assumption, we define a modified version of the 7 -core, denoted 0 - 
core. We then show how some recent applications of the 7 -core to oligopolistic markets 
and public goods production problems are affected by our assumption. For the linear 
oligopoly case, we prove that, although the 7 -core is very large, the only allocation in 
the 0-core is the equal split allocation. For the linear-quadratic oligopoly, conversely, 
we show that, differently from the 7 -core, the 0-core is empty. For the case of public 
goods production, we consider a simple economy with one public and one private good, 
and we discuss the validity of Chander and Tulkens (1997) result of non-emptiness of 
the 7 -core. We consider the case of symmetric agents, and show that if preferences 
are linear in the public good, then the allocation the authors propose belongs to the 
0-core. However, if preferences are strictly concave, the 0-core is shown to be empty 
for the specific case of quadratic utility and quadratic cost.
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5.2 T h e general set-up
Let r  =  J a strategic form game, where N  is the (finite)
players set, X i is the strategy set of player z, and X s  is the strategy set of a coalition 
of players Let P{N) be the set of all possible partitions tt of the players set N] 
let Xtt denote the set X t ,  for any tt G P{N ). The set % =  |J  Xt^ is the set
T€7t i r e P{ N)
of all possible outcomes (in terms of strategies) of the game P. The function Ui : X  
—)■ represents players’ preferences. We restrict our attention to transferable utility
functions Ui.
D efinition 5 A Nash Equilibrium o fT  is a strategy profile x  such that, for all i £ N , 
Xi e  X i and, for all Xi e  X i, Ui (x) > Ui {xi,x^i).
5 .2 .1  T h e  value fu n ction  under th e  ^ -assu m p tion
The 7 -assumption postulates that the worth of a coalition is the aggregate utility of 
its members in the Nash equilibrium between that coalition (acting as a single player) 
and the outside players (acting as singletons). The value function v^[S) is defined for 
all 5  Ç  by:
=  {xs, (5.1)
i e s
where.
and, Vj 6  N \S ,
£s  = a r g m a x  ( z g ,  ( 5 - 2 )
X .  =argm ax u, (xg, {xk}ke{N\s)\{j} > ^ i)  ■ (5-3)XjEXj  ^ '
J- 
i&S
^Note that, in general, X s  may not coincide with the set X
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D efin ition  6 The joint strategy x  G X n  is in the j-core, if there exists no coalition S
such that {S) > '^U i  (£).
ies
5 .2 .2  T h e  value fu n ction  under th e  0 -a ssu m p tio n
The new value function we introduce is based on the assumption that deviating coali­
tions exploit a first-mover advantage. As under the 7 -assumption, when a coalition S  
forms, players in N \ S  split up as singletons. Differently from the 7  case, the members 
of S  choose a coordinated strategy as leaders, thus anticipating the reaction of the play­
ers in N \S ,  who simultaneously choose their best response as singletons. The strategy 
profile associated to the deviation of a coalition S  is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the 
game in which S  is the leader and the players in N \S  are, individually, the followers. 
We denote this strategy profile as a partial equilibrium with respect to S. Formally, 
this is the strategy profile x  (S) = {xs, Xj{xs)) such that
X s  = argmax (xs, {Xj(xs)} )  (5.4)
and, Vj G N \S ,
X j { x s )  = argmax uj [ x s ,  , x J  . (5.5)
XjEXj '  '
We first establish sufficient condition for the existence of x (S).
For every coalition S  C N  and strategy profile Xs G Xs ,  we define the restriction 
F (N\S ,Xs )  of the game F to the set of players N \S ,  given the fixed profile Xs-
P roposition  13 Let T be a strategic form game. For every S  d  N  and Xs G X s , let 
the game F ( N\S ,Xs)  possess a unique Nash Equilibrium. For every S  G N , let X s  be 
compact. Let each player’s payoff be continuous in every other player’s strategy. Then,
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for every S  CZ N , there exists a partial equilibrium of T with respect to S. Moreover, 
if  payoffs are strictly concave in each players strategy, such a partial equilibrium is 
unique.
P ro o f. By condition (5.5), the strategy profile {^j(^s)}j^]\f\s the unique Nash 
equilibrium of P {N\S,  Xs). By the closedness of the Nash equilibrium correspondence 
(see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pag.30), members of S  maximize a 
continuous function over a compact set (condition (5.4)); thus, by Weiestrass Theorem, 
a maximum exists. Uniqueness comes as a straight forward consequence of the strict 
concavity of the leader’s maximization problem. ■
We can thus define the value function n<^ (<S') as follows:
{^j(^s)}jgAf\s) • (5 6 )
ieS
D efin ition  7 The joint strategy x  Z X n  is in the (j)-core, if  there exists no coalition S
such that Vcf) {S) > ^ U i  {x).
i e s
In the next to sections we apply the concept of 0-core to two widely studied eco­
nomic problems: cartel formation in oligopolies and resource allocation in economies 
with public goods.
5.3 C artel form ation in o ligopoly
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the application of cooperative 
solution concepts to the problem of cartel formation under oligopoly [see, for a survey, 
Bloch (1997)]. A specific use of the 7 -core is contained, for instance, in Raj an (1989). 
The author shows that in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and
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quadratic costs, for a number of firms n > 3, firms never chose to stay separate (i.e., 
giving rise to the coalition structure {1 ,1 ,...,!}); moreover, it is proved that, for n < 4, 
the 7 -core is non empty.
In what follows, after a short description of the Cournot setting, we first show 
that, in a symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and linear costs, the 7 -core strictly 
includes the equal split allocation for any number of firms. For the same model specifi­
cation we then prove that the equal split allocation is the unique allocation contained 
in the ^-core. Finally, we show that, when costs are quadratic, the </>-core can be empty.
5 .3 .1  T h e  C ournot se tt in g
Let 7Ti (y, yi) =  p (y) yi — Q  be the profit function of every firm z E =  { 1 ,2 ,..., n},
n
where y  ^ is the output of a firm, y = Yh Vi fke total output, p [y) the usual inverse
i=l
demand function and Q  {yi) the cost function of every firm. Let also Q  (.) =  Cj{ .) ,  
for every i, j  in N.
We introduce the following standard assumptions;
A . l  The function TTj (.) is twice continuously differentiable;
A .  2  For every firm i, the capacity constraint y  ^ < 00 determines the maximum 
production level;
A  3  p” (.) yi -\-p' (.) < 0  and p' (.) -  C'- <  0 .
Consistently with Section 2, we now define the normal form game, denoted as Fi, 
associated to our problem. Each player (firm) strategy set is:
=  [Vi c  : yi <  yi }  =  Yi- ( 5 . 7 )
Players’ preferences are linear in profit and, for every coalition S, the strategy set is
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represented by:
-^ 5 = < { y s , t s )  : ys  G a n d ^5 = such that = 0 >
I  ies ies J
(5.8)
where ts  is a vector of transfers.
Proposition  14 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game F i .
Proof. By A .l, every player’s payoff functions is continuous in the strategy profile 
y y N and, by A.3, strictly concave on yi. By A.2, strategy sets are non empty, 
compact and convex, so that existence of a Nash equilibrium follows. Uniqueness is 
implied by A.3 as follows. Since, for each firm, p”yi +  p' < 0 and p'— C” < 0, the 
function F  {yi ,y)  =  p'yi p  — C  is decreasing both in yi and y.  In fact, =
pi— C'l < 0 and =  p”yi +  p' < 0 . Suppose now that there exist two Nash
Equilibria y^ and y^ of Fi. Suppose also, without loss of generality, that y^ > y"^ . At a
n  n
Nash Equilibrium, p'yi +  p — Q  =  0, so that, if Y ly] > ^  it follows from A.3 that
i= l  i=l
y] < yi for every i = 1 , n, leading to a contradiction. ■
5 .3 .2  T h e  7-core
By applying the definition of (5) to the Cournot setting introduced above, we obtain 
the following expression:
^7 (*^ ) = ' ^ [ p { y s , y - s ) y i  -  Q  (p%) +  S] (5.9)
ies
where
ys = arg max V  [p {ys, P-s) P% ~ Q  (p%) +  (5.10)
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and where U is the equilibrium lump-sum transfer for every i E S,  and
yj = argmax p yj,ys,  yk | Vj ~  Q  {Vj), Vj G N \S .  (5.11)
Vj^^j \\  kgs,
By A.l, we can differentiate v^ y (S') and, by symmetry of players, the strategy profile 
y  G Yn  characterizing (S') is such that, for every 2 G S', respects:
P (y) +  P' {y) syi = C'i {yi), (5.12)
where s = [S'], while, for every j  G A\S', yj respects:
P {.ÿ) + p'(y) Vi = Cj (ÿj ) . (5.13)
5 .3 .3  T h e  < p -c o re
We now apply our equilibrium concept to the oligopolistic setting described above. 
According to the general setup, the function u^(S) is as follows:
MS)  =  1 3  [p {yÀys)}jeN\s) ÿi ~ Mvs) + û (5-i4)
ies
where
ÿs = argmax ^  \p (ys, {yj{ys)}jeN\s) Vi ~  ^i(yi) +  (5.15)
ies
and Vj £ N \ S ,
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y ^ y s )  =  argm ax p  (j/s, { y k ( y s ) } ke(N\s)\{j} , %) % -  Cj W -  (5 16)
yj-eyj ^
Note first that, as ^  fi =  0, the function ^^(5') is fully defined by the choice of a vector 
ies
ys by the members of S.
P ro p o s itio n  15 There exists a unique value (S') for every S  C N.
P ro o f. We apply Proposition 13. By Proposition 14, there exists a unique Nash 
equilibrium for every restricted game Fi {N\S,ys)-  Continuity of payoffs follows from 
A .l and compactness of every strategy set from A.2. Moreover, by A.3 payoffs are 
strictly concave, so that the value (S) is unique. ■
According to the above result, under A .l and symmetry, the FOCs characterizing
y E Yn  are, for every i E S:
P [y] Y p '  (y) sÿi = C'i (ÿi) (5.17)
and, Vj E N \ S ,
p  (y)  +  p' (y)  y 3 { ÿ s )  =  C'- (% (% )). (5 .i8 )
5 .3 .4  T h e  linear case
Having defined the 7  and ÿ-core for the Cournot setting, we now study the linear case, 
i.e. the case in which p{y) = a — by, and, for every i E N,  Ci [yi) =  cj/j, with a > c > 0 
and 6 > 0 .
P ro p o s itio n  16 Under linearity and symmetry, the 7 -core of the game Ti is non 
empty and strictly includes the equal split allocation.
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P ro o f. Condition (5.12) implies that: 
and
(a -  c f
V r y  (S') —
6  ^ (n — s +  2 )
where s =  |S| and n = |A^|. Without loss of generality let us normalize =  1,
so that the equal split allocation gives to each player in N  a payoff of ^  and
^7 (S) = (n-l+2y  ’
Consider now the equal split allocation for a coalition S, Whatever
^  ^  s ( n - s + 2 ) ^
distribution of the worth (S) may be chosen by S, at least one player in S  must get
a payoff not greater than • This implies that coalition S improves upon the
equal split allocation for N  if and only if
1 1
>
s (n — s +  2)  ^ 4n
Straightforward calculations show that the above inequality is satisfied respectively for:
s > n
n — yJvP- + %n 
s < 2 H--------- --------- < 1
n 4- V n^T S n  s >--- 2 H---------   > n
and hence, it is never satisfied for 1 < s < n. It follows that the equal split allocation
for N, characterized by the strategy vectors (y, ?) , where ÿ  respects (5.12) and y = 
(0,0,..., 0), belongs to the 7 -core. To see that this allocation is strictly included in the 
7 -core, note that, since individual deviations assign to a player just Vr^  ({%}) =  <
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different and unequal allocations belong as well to the 7 -core. In particular, 
any allocation giving to a player % his worth ^^ 7 ({*}), and to
any remaining player, is not object able. ■
We now characterize the ^-core of the game F1 under linearity and symmetry. The 
next proposition shows that, once deviating coalitions are allowed to exploit a first 
mover advantage, all allocations but the equal split one are blocked.
P ro p o s itio n  17 In a linear symmetric oligopoly the equal-split allocation is the unique 
allocation belonging to the (f)-core.
P roof. As in the proof of Proposition 16, under normalization, we get:
w  =  \
and, from condition (5.17),
=  4 ( n - \  +  l)-
Hence, straightforward calculations show that, for every S  G N , is less than
for 1 < s < n, and equal to either for s =  n or s =  1 . It follows that, since in 
any deviating coalition S  G N  a.t least one player gets a payoff less than or equal to 
no coalition S G N  can make all its member better off than in the equal split 
allocation 7^ ^ ,  which is then in the (fycoie. To see that the equal-split is the unique 
allocation in the 0 -core, note that any other allocation would require to give to at least 
one player less than However, such a player could always improve his payoff by
deviating and, from the result above, getting a worth equal to ({z}) =  ■
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5 .3 .5  T h e  linear-quadratic case
We now consider the case of linear demand function p[y) — a — y and quadratic cost 
function Q  [yi) =  As indicated above, we know from Raj an (1989) that, for n =  2 , 
n = 3 and n =  4, the 7 -core is non empty. We now show that this result does not hold 
under the < -^core assumption.
By conditions (5.17) and (5.18), the following result can be proved.^
P ro p o s itio n  18 Under linear demand and quadratic costs for every firm, the f)-core 
can be empty.
P ro o f. From first order conditions, it is obtained that:
V4, [N) =
(1 +  2n y
and
Simple calculations show that, for every i E N , and for n > 2, ({z}) > 7^ ^ .  By
efficiency of the equal split solution, in any other efficient allocation at least one player 
would receive a lower utility. This fact together with the above result that any player 
can improve upon the equal split allocation by deviating as singleton, imply that any 
efficient allocation can be objected by the deviation of a single player. This, in turn, 
implies that the 0 -core is empty. ■
 ^Which presented here is just an example that removes the assumption of functions linearity and 
gives rise to emptiness of the (fhcove. It is plausible to claim that other non linear examples can be 
found in which the solution set (in terms of allocations), is either empty or possesses more than one 
allocation, respectively, as a result of the specific functions selected.
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5.4 T h e core o f  a public good  econom y
In this section we study the 0-core of an economy with one private and one public 
good. We mostly refer to the work on 7 -core by Chander and Tulkens (1997) (C-T 
hereafter), and show that their results carry over to the 0 -core if and only if preferences 
are linear in the public good.®
5.4 .1  T h e  econom y
We consider an economy with one public good q and one private good y.  The set of
agents \s N  = {1 ,..., n}; each agent i is endowed with units of the private good, and
produces the public good out of the private good with convex cost Q(g^). For every
S  C N , we denote by qs the vector (%)^gg, and by Qs the term ^  for simplicity, we
i e s
write q instead of q^ and Q  instead of Qtv- Preferences are represented by a quasilinear 
utility function Ui {q, yi) = Vi (Q)  +?/%. We denote by 7Ti(Q) = the marginal rate of
substitution between public and private good for player i, and for all coalitions S' Ç A^ ,
we let 7Vs{Q) denote the term ^2 ^i(Q)-
i e s
We make the following assumptions.
A .4: Vi {Q)  concave, twice differentiable and such that 7Ti{Q) > 0 for all q such
that C^iqi) < Y  
i eN ieN
A .5: Q(%) strictly concave, twice differentiable and such that Q(%) > 0 for all 
q i > ^  and Q(%) =  0 for qi = 0 .
We associate to this economy the normal form game denoted P2 , where strategy 
sets and preferences are as follows:
® Although C-T’s results are obtained for an economy with pollution, they generalize to public 
goods economies under the assumptions made in this paper.
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=  {(%,%/t) E : C W  +3/i <  ;
^ 5  =  1  {qs, ys)  G ^  C* ( ç i )  <  ^  ^  ?/i 1 i
I  zGS i e 5  i£S J
Ui (x) = Vi (Q) +  Pi.
P ro p o s itio n  19 (Chander-Tulkens): There exists a unique Nash Equilibrium of 
the game T2.
The Nash Equilibrium (q,ÿ)  =  (?i, •••, 9n, ÿi, ÿn) of P2 is characterized by the 
following FOC’s:
TTi (Q) =  (%), V2 G AT. (5.19)
5 .4 .2  T h e  7-core
Chander an Tulkens propose a specific allocation {q*,y*),  bearing for an equilibrium 
interpretation of the economy E, and show by construction that it belongs to the 7 -core 
of the game F2. We report their result in the following proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  20 (Chander-Tulkens): The joint strategy {q*,y*) where: 
q* is such that tvn {Q*) = C[ {q*), for all i e N ;
is in the 7 -core.
E  (9.*) -  Ci m
.ieN
In what follows we will refer to {q*,y*) as the C-T allocation.
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5 .4 .3  T h e  0-core
In this section we analyze the symmetric case (identical players) and we show that 
under linear preferences, Proposition 20 carries over to the case of 0-core. However, 
we also show that, if preferences are strictly concave, the 0 -core may be empty.
T h e  fu n c tio n
By definition, any partial equilibrium [(gs,ys), {<lj,yj) {Qs,ys)] o f f^  with respect to S  
is such that
qs e  argmax Qs +  V  Qj {qs) +
i e s  y  j e N \ s  J  i e s
s.t. ^  [Ci {qi) +  Vi]
i e s  i e s
and, Vj 6  N \ S
qj {Qs) = arg max Uj Qs +  Y ]  qj {qs) +  9; +  %
s.t. Uj > Cj{qj)-\-yj
' ke{ N\s ) \ { j }
P ro p o s itio n  21 For every S  C N , there exists a partial equilibrium o fT 2 with respect 
to S. Moreover, all partial equilibria with respect to S  are characterized by the same 
vector q.
P ro o f. By Proposition 19, the Nash equilibrium o f l ^  {N\S,qs)  exists and is unique 
for all S  and qs. By continuity of (A.4), and of (%), (A.5), Proposition 13 can be 
applied here. Moreover, as the maximization problem of S  can be written as a function 
of just qs, by concavity of Vi and strict convexity of Q  {qi), Proposition 13 can again 
be applied to show uniqueness. ■
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Som e ch a rac te r iz a tio n  o f th e  p a r tia l  equ ilib ria  o f P2
We now analyze in greater detail the partial equilibria of P2.
We first consider the first order condition for every player j  G N \S :  by symmetry, 
we can write
{Qj +  (n- — s  — l)qj +  Qs) — C  (qj) = 0. (5.20)
By Assumptions A.4 and a.5 and applying the implicit function theorem to the map­
ping /  {qj, qs) = 7Tj {{n — s)qj +  Qs) — C  [qj), we conclude that the function qj (qs) is 




1 -t- ( n  -  s )
9qj
dQs
yielding the reaction function
dqj _  aq . < 0 .
9Qs C" (%) -  (ra -  s)
The term gives us the reaction of player j  to changes in the vector qs as determined
by the changes in f s  Nash equilibrium strategy in the game P2 [N\S,  qs)-
Given the reaction function of each outside player j ,  the maximization problem of 
coalition S  yields the following FOCs:
7Ts ( q )  +  (n -  5) = C  [qi) , y i e S .  (5.21)
By plugging the expression for into (5.21), we obtain
TTs [Qs +  (n — s) • qj [qs)) [I — k) = [qi) (5.22)
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where /  T^T,
0 < ( l - f c ) =  ( n - s ) — — ^ 5 ----- ^  +  1 |  < 1 .  (5.23)
\  C'l (9;) -
Indeed, the presence of the term (1 — k) is the only difference between our optimal­
ity conditions and the ones obtained by C-T. Comparing the conditions characterizing 
Vry and it can be easily checked that the aggregate amount of public good induced 
by the deviation of a coalition S  under the 7 -assumption is greater than or equal to 
that induced under the ÿ-assumption.
In order to prepare the analysis of the next section, we establish here some prop­
erties of partial equilibria. We will refer to the original concept of partial equilibrium 
introduced by C-T as to the partial equilibria under the 7 -assumption.
Lem m a 22 The aggregate amount of public good produced in the partial equilibrium 
with respect to S  is not greater under the (f)-assumption than under the 'y-assumption.
P ro o f. Let {S) and Q'  ^{S) be the aggregate levels of public goods in the partial 
equilibrium w.r.t. S  under (f) and 7 -assumption, respectively. Suppose that [S) >
(5); then, by FOC (5.20), for each player j  6  N \S^ {S) < gj (S'). Moreover, as 
(1 — k) < 1 , by FOC (5.22) for every player z 6  S, qf (S) < q] (S). The two inequalities 
imply a contradiction. ■
Lemma (22) and Proposition 5 in Chander-Tulkens (1997) imply that the aggre­
gate amount of public good produced in the partial equilibrium w.r.t. S under the (f) 
assumption is not greater than the efficient one.
Lem m a 23 I f  preferences are linear in the public good, then: 
i ) q f { S ) < q t , y i e N ;
a)  <  q f  {S), Vi e  N;  
ni )q ,  = q f { S ) , V j e N \ S .
120
Proof, i): By definition of the term (1 — k) in condition (5.23), if preferences are 
linear then (1 — fc) =  1. By condition (5.22) this implies the following implications for 
all z G 5:
Q  {^t  — '^s =  Q  iOi) •
Similarly, for all j  G N \ S ,  condition (5.20) implies:
The two implications, together with strict convexity of Q (.) for every z G TV, imply 
the result.
ii) and Hi): By conditions (5.22) and (5.19), for all i E S:
C'i (?i) =  TTi < 7Ts =  C- [qt (S) j  .
By conditions (5.20) and (5.19), for all j  G N \S :
i^j) — '^ 3 — {o-j '
Again by convexity of cost functions, the results follow. ■
The robustness o f Chander-Tulkens result under linear preferences
We are now able to show that under linear preferences for the public good, Proposition 
20 by C-T generalizes to the 0-core.
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Proposition  24 I f  preferences are linear, then the C-T allocation {q*,y*) belongs to 
the (j)-core.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 in Chander-Tulkens (1997) can be directly applied 
using Lemma (23). Indeed, Lemma (23) establishes all the properties that are needed 
in the proof of that proposition. ■
T he 0-instability  o f Chander-Tnlkens allocation under non-linear prefer­
ences
Under non linear preferences, C-T’s result requires an additional assumption (Assump­
tion 1” in their paper) concerning the marginal rate of substitution characterizing re­
spectively a Nash and an efficient allocation. Under this assumption, and using a few 
properties both of Nash and partial equilibrium allocations under the 7 -assumption, 
the authors prove Proposition 20 also for the non linear case. Using the notation in­
troduced in the previous sections, such properties are that q] (S) > qi, for all i E S, 
and that ql {S) < qj, for all j  E N \S .
It is easy to check that the first property does not longer hold under the ^-assumption: 
indeed, in C-T’s paper this property is proved through the following chain of implica­
tions:
C'i (97 (S)) = 7T5 {Q-' (5)) > TTs (Q*) > nj {Q)  =  C ’ ( % ) .
where the inequality tts {Q*) >  ttj (Q) is indeed Assumption I ” .
Under (^-assumption, the above chain of implications would write
C ' [qf  ( 5 ) )  =  TTS (5 ))  ( ! - * ) >  TTs (Q -) >  7T,. (Q ) =  Ci (%)
which, as {1 — k) < I by non-linearity of preferences, may well not be true. Actually,
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as Example 1 below shows, linearity turns out to be a necessary condition for C-T 
result to carry over under assumption. Indeed, as it is proved in Proposition (25), in 
Example 1 the (/>-core is empty.
E x am p le  3. Let preferences be described by the utility function
Ui{q,Xi) =  (Q-aQ^) + y i  
and let costs be described by the function
C(g) =  |- -
It can be easily checked that Assumption 1” in Chander-Tulkens (1997) is satisfied if 
a  > | .
We consider the deviation of a single player i, producing a zero amount of public good. 
By showing that, given the reactions of the other players, this strategy represents for 
him an improvement upon the allocation proposed by C-T, we show that he can improve 
upon it under the ^-assumption, as zero production is always a feasible strategy for 
him. The reaction of the other (n — 1) players to the "no production” strategy of i is 
obtained by the FOC
1 — 2cx.qj ( t i  — 1) =
yielding
_ 1
1 +  2a  (n -  1)
and
Q = ______ ______________
^  l +  2 a ( n - l ) '
By using Samuelson’s efficiency condition.
n (l — 2 aQ*) =  —  




1 +  2ri^a '
We are then able to compare the utility (u* ) received by i in the C-T allocation with 
the utility that i receives through a (zero production) deviation:
n
Ui a
1 +  2n ‘^ a 
7 7 , - 1  
1 +  2 a  (?2 — 1 )
n
1 +  2n?a
1 n
— a 7 7 , - 1
2 \1  +  2n^a 
2
1 4- 2a  (77 — 1)
By straightforward calculations, it turns out that, for 77, > 2 and a  > 0.5, {u^ — 77^ ) is
always positive; hence, every player can individually improve upon the C-T allocation, 
which, therefore, is not in the 0-core. We report in the table below a few numerical 
values for (u^ — 7^ ).
77, =  2, a = 0.5 
77, =  10, a  =  0.5
(779 -  77*) =  0.224
( « ? - < )  =  0 .8
77 =  50, a  =  0.5 (77° — 77*) =  0.96
77 =  100, a  =  0.5 (779 — u*) = 0.98
P ro p o s itio n  25 Let costs and preference be as in Example 1. Then the (j)-core of the 
associated cooperative game is empty.
P roof. It is shown in Example 1 that any player could improve upon C-T’s solution by 
exploiting a first mover advantage. By efficiency of that solution, for any other efficient 
solution (q,y), at least one player i would receive a lower utility than in (q*,y*)- But 
as any player can improve upon {q*,y*) by deviating as singleton, than player i can 
improve upon {q, y) in the same way. ■
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5.5 C oncluding rem arks
This paper has presented a new solution concept for cooperative games. Our concept 
modifies the 7 -core by introducing a temporal structure in the choices of strategies in 
the underlying normal form game which is similar to the one adopted in the a-core. 
At the same time, it is maintained the 7 -assumption that outside players react to a 
forming coalition by splitting up into singletons. This approach is meant to account 
for those cases in which coalitions can break an agreement and, in so doing, force the 
outside players to react to their new strategy.
In this paper we have focused our attention on two applications: Cournot oligopolies 
and public good provision. Our results on cartel formation show that, in a linear 
symmetric oligopoly, considering the 0 -core restricts the set of core outcomes to the 
equal split allocation. Moreover, differently from the 7 -core, under quadratic costs the 
0-core may be empty. In the second application, Chander and Tulkens (1997) results 
are shown to be robust against the temporal structure assumed in the 0 -core if and 
only if preferences are linear in the public good. In the case of non linear preferences, 
conversely, whenever a coalition can exploit a first mover advantage, the 7 -assumption 
on coalition formation is no longer sufficient to yield a non-empty core.
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